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
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


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# THE ITALIAN CAUSE:

ITS HISTORY AND ITS HOPES.

ITALY'S APPEAL TO A FREE  
*A. N.*  
NATION.

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TO

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
THE STATESMAN OF THE ITALIAN CAUSE,

THIS EFFORT TO AID

THE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF ITALY

IS INSCRIBED.





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## INTRODUCTION.

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THESE pages are offered to the attention of the British public, in the conviction that the Italian question is not yet withdrawn either from the influence of public opinion or the action of European statesmanship.

It is a mistake to suppose that this question is settled by the agreement between the Emperors at Villa Franca. Points of the utmost importance remain open for discussion, and it is by no means clear that even the outline agreed upon is understood by France and Austria in the same way.

Within the limits of that agreement, not very distinctly laid down in the statements that have been published, it is possible to find the elements of a settlement which might offer to the Peninsula a fair prospect of peace and progress.

But it is also easy to find the elements of one which might, in reality, do little for the cause of

Italian freedom ; while, on the other hand, by recognising and perpetuating Austrian influence, it would aggravate the real evil which has long afflicted and desolated Italy.

In a settlement admitting of such opposite developments, there is abundant room for differences and disputes which once arising must inevitably involve an appeal to the general opinion of Europe, possibly even to arms.

Independently of all this, the Italian question is one that cannot be settled by any two men. There are other parties to that question. First, the Italian people, firm in their inextinguishable hatred of Austrian despotism, and determined in their resolution that one day or other Italy shall be free. Secondly, the powers of Europe, who are parties to the European settlement by which the present arrangements have been confirmed.

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It does not seem possible that in the final settlement of Italian affairs the Emperor Napoleon can ever be a party to a state of things under which Austrian influence and Austrian intervention will still coerce to despotism the Italian States.

The recent war was commenced not for any purpose of territorial change, but for the express purpose of repelling an invasion of Sardinia—indirectly for the purpose of resisting that intolerable and predominant influence over Italy which Austria had assumed.

It is possible, therefore, to close that war with honour and good faith, without insisting on the entire cession of Austrian territory in Italy.

But its great end would be incomplete if it left undisturbed that system by which Austria, in defiance of the spirit if not the letter of the treaty of Vienna, has established a cruel and oppressive dictatorship over three-fourths of Italy.

If this be permitted to continue, the accession of Lombardy to Sardinia, important as it unquestionably is, would not compensate for the surrender of the rest of Italy to Austrian misrule.

Such an arrangement never could give peace to Italy: its establishment would be the signal for insurrections in every part of its centre and South, insurrections excited and inflamed by the presence of a free independent Northern State.

If, indeed, Sardinia were to change one particle of her institutions to accommodate herself to a new



system of confederative tyranny, then the arrangement would be a deadly blow to the cause of Italian freedom.

If Austria retains her Italian influence and her despotic system, while Sardinia perseveres in free and liberal institutions in Piedmont and extends them to Lombardy, the danger to which Sardinia has been exposed is not removed. The Italian question is left unsettled for another course of disquietude to Europe and another war.

Enough has been said perhaps to show that the marvellous events of Villa Franca do not supersede the necessity of informing the public opinion of Europe, or of an appeal on behalf of the true cause of suffering Italy to the sympathies of free and happy England.

The following pages supply internal evidence that they were written before this meeting of two individuals had attempted to settle a question involving not only the public law of Europe but the dearest interests and the deepest passions of millions of the human race.

They were written with a view of urging a different settlement from that which appears to have been reluctantly adopted. They were intended as

an appeal to England, even at the eleventh hour, to throw the weight of her influence into the cause of Italy, cruelly suffering, and Sardinia, unjustly assailed.

The opportunity for this will yet arise. The English nation are already beginning to perceive the position of influence and power which they lost by the hollow and false-hearted neutrality of Lord Malmesbury. If the French Emperor seems to disregard England's policy and England's opinion, he surely can find his justification in the cold and scarcely civil refusal with which Lord Malmesbury met his earnest appeal for even the moral support of England.\* It is not for us to blame

\* On the 26th of April Count Walewaki wrote to the French Ambassador a despatch in which he earnestly invited the frank and cordial co-operation of England in concerting the most suitable means of attaining an object which, in the opinion of the French Cabinet, should be common to the policy of the two countries—that object being the protection of Piedmont.

On the 5th of May Lord Malmesbury replied to this offer in an elaborate despatch, in which he threw all the blame of the quarrel on Sardinia, and professed the intention of England to be strictly neutral.

Of the true meaning of such neutrality the reader of these pages will be able, when he peruses the statement of the facts, to form a correct opinion. It simply meant license to Austria to violate public law.

Fortunately the Emperor of the French did not share in this neutrality, or Sardinia would not now exist.

him for retiring from an attack upon the Quadrilateral lest he might involve himself in a German war—when our Foreign Secretary announced to Europe that the English minister would not take upon himself the responsibility of dissuading the German princes from any course they might think fit to adopt, as he could not offer them even a moral guarantee as to the ultimate objects of the war. A Roman Catholic sovereign can scarcely be blamed for showing some little deference to the Papal power, when, of the two great Protestant nations of Europe, one actually menaced, the other was undisguisedly hostile to the attempt “to free Italy from the Adriatic “to the Alps!!”

Lord Derby did not consider it inconsistent with his station, as first minister of the Queen, to denounce the Italian war as one “undertaken under false pretences,” and reprobate the conduct of Sardinia, as proving that a small state, with free institutions,

These two despatches will be found in the Parliamentary Papers upon Italy (January to May), Nos. 438 and 435. It is impossible for any one to read them both without feeling that from that hour the French and English alliance was broken, and broken by the unaccountable refusal of England even to hold consultation with “her faithful ally” as to the means by which Sardinia might be saved from annihilation by the despotic power of Austria.

might be just as dangerous to the peace of his neighbour as a great military despotism.

Those who were ready to applaud and repeat this language are now the loudest in condemning Louis Napoleon for not continuing the war until he had achieved the complete emancipation of Italy.

If there be shortcomings in the terms upon which peace is proposed, the language and the conduct of English ministers preclude Englishmen from fastening the blame upon the Emperor of the French.

It is manifest that some of the objects which he sought he has consented to abandon. He did so as the result of a careful review of his position at the gates of Verona. Whatever may be thought of the reasons which influenced him, it is in his power to point to one which, unhappily, Europe can appreciate, and to say that England had deserted the cause of European freedom.

Much of what was written, nay, actually printed in these pages, has become inapplicable to the present course of events. At the same time the alterations have been fewer than might have been supposed. It is even more necessary now for Italy to appeal to the sympathies of the free English

nation—to invite, nay to implore, the discussions of her wrongs in that British Senate which has been mesmerised into an inglorious, and, for the interests of freedom—fatal silence—and to call everywhere upon Englishmen to give to the cause of liberty the benefit of their sympathy and opinion.

The occasion for this may arise much sooner than is expected. Even a few days may bring events that will change the whole position of affairs. But in all the shifting and changing scenes of Italian politics, let this be clearly and unequivocally acknowledged, that no settlement can give peace to Italy which will allow Austrian influence to maintain its former ascendancy.

To establish this by the decisive testimony of historical facts, this work was undertaken.

The facts established may be briefly summed up.

Since the peace of 1815, the influence of Austria has been the source of all the evils of Italy. In violation of the spirit, if not the letter of the treaty of Vienna, she imposed by force and violence her own despotic system of government upon other Italian States. She made war upon their sovereigns wherever they dared to grant free institutions to their people.

She sent overwhelming forces to crush every movement for popular freedom in blood.

She degraded every Italian sovereign, except the King of Sardinia, to the condition of a serf of the empire.

By intrigue, by threats, and by force she repeatedly attempted to reduce Piedmont to the same position.

She steadily adhered to the policy openly avowed by Metternich, that force must be used to repress every attempt to establish representative institutions in any part of Italy.

By these means she succeeded in establishing a system of government throughout the greater part of Italy which has crushed down a whole people, condemning them to poverty and misery, and to those constant and desperate insurrections by which a high-minded nation will always prove, however unwisely, its hatred of oppression.

Since the Sardinian King gave to his people free institutions, Austria has persecuted him with the most unrelenting hostility, watching for the opportunity of his destruction.

For ten years she had been preparing for this, by

extending her military outposts into districts bordering on Piedmont, whether those districts belonged to her own territory, or to that of States supposed by the treaty of Vienna to be independent.

Against this system of organised aggression the Sardinian Government constantly protested, and with the support of France and England appealed at the Congress of Paris to the assembled representatives of Europe to interfere.

Austria, notwithstanding, persevered, and in the beginning of the present year, was manifestly concentrating her preparations for an invasion of Sardinia, to crush for ever her hated institutions.

This state of things was the necessary consequence of the irreconcilable antagonism between free institutions and the system of tyranny which Austria considers essential to her rule: both could not co-exist in the Peninsula.

The war of this year originated remotely in those causes, immediately in the violent and treacherous invasion of Piedmont by an Austrian army—an invasion secretly planned for the express purpose of extinguishing Sardinia by a surprise. The accidental betrayal of the design, communicated by tele-

graph to Paris, alone defeated it, and enabled the French Emperor to send troops in time for the defence.

The proofs, the incontestable proofs of these things are laid before the English public in the following pages; it is for the English people to say what part they wish their country to take in any struggle that may arise in which England may be called on, at least to express an opinion upon the great question of "ITALIAN INDEPENDENCE."

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Those who peruse these pages will observe that the sentiment expressed towards the Emperor of the French is one very different from that distrust and suspicion which, in the minds of many, the exertions of his enemies have been too successful in exciting.

The peace of Villa Franca, while it has completely refuted and ought to have put to shame the malignant predictions of those who asserted that the result of the Italian war would prove that it was entered into from motives of family aggrandisement, is now used by those who uttered those predictions to charge him with having betrayed the Italian cause.



These subjects will be found more fully discussed in a subsequent page. Betrayal of the Italian cause there was none. It is perfectly plain that he turned back from the invasion of Venice, because had he persevered his proceeding would have involved Europe in a general, and what must have been a revolutionary war.

Those who blame him for pausing—those who say he ought to have gone on and dared all that might have followed—for the sake of wresting Venice from Austria, are the very persons who in their speeches and despatches, denounced with horror the “crime,” as they called it, of exciting a general war, and put forward the faith of treaties as securing Austria her possessions! They are the very persons whose conduct placed in his way the difficulty from which he retreated!

The terms of the Villa Franca compromise, even in their worst interpretation, attain the great object for which the war was originally begun. The invader is driven back, and some security is given to Sardinia against future attacks by the strength she acquires in the cession of Lombardy. One great Italian province is made free.

All was in fact done that the Emperor of the French could do, if he were left single-handed in Europe to sustain the Sardinian cause.

No doubt this settlement is incomplete. If carried out in the sense which Austrian partizans put upon it, it leaves the Italian question still to be fought out, but fought under circumstances much more favourable to the Italian cause.

We must recollect that during the whole progress of the war, nothing was ever said about a settlement of Southern Italy. No promise was ever given that there should be any interference with Naples or with Rome—the whole avowed object of the contest was the security of Sardinian independence, and, subsequently, the freedom of Northern Italy.

These views of the occurrences of Villa Franca are perfectly consistent with the strong opinion, that it is absolutely necessary to the peace of Italy and Europe that steps should be taken to put an end for ever to that system of Austrian interference and domination which is shown to have existed in the Peninsula since 1815. But it is too soon to charge the French Emperor with neglecting this. In the

first place, the time is not come for such an arrangement. Those who rush to conclusions unfavourable to the Italian cause, ought at least to wait the result of the Conference at Zurich. In the next place, the provisions which would effectually secure the independence of Italian states, ought to be adopted with the assent of a European Congress, and under the guarantee of European law.

If the peace of Villa Franca has done nothing else, it will bring the whole question of Italy fairly before a European Congress, when the opinion of European nations can be expressed free from the disturbing influence occasioned by the apprehensions of those schemes of conquest which were attributed to Napoleon during the war.

Upon the part that England takes will depend her own influence and position in Europe. Her frank adhesion to the liberal cause is of vital consequence to the freedom of Italy, but it is of at least equal importance to her own character and interest.

Surely the time is come when we are bound to give to those who since the Crimean war are our natural allies—France and Sardinia—our cordial sup-

port in securing for Italy the best settlement which the terms arranged at Villa Franca will admit.\* Our doing so may be requisite to save Europe from the calamities that would follow a renewal of the war.

But above all things let England at once put an end to that estrangement from France, which can never exist without danger to the best interests of Europe. Louis Napoleon in the very act for which he is condemned has given decisive proof that the accusations made against him of entertaining designs

\* The friendly understanding which has no doubt existed first between Sardinia and Russia, and subsequently between France and Russia, is not caused by hostility to England. It originated in the withdrawal of England from the Sardinian alliance.

This subject is one of too much importance to discuss in a few lines, but a reference to its leading features may be of use.

For the last three years, at least, it has been perfectly evident that Sardinia must be destroyed unless she could find an ally strong enough to protect her, and upon whose good faith and readiness to do so she could perfectly depend. This was an absolute necessity to Sardinia.

The accession of the Tory ministry to power in the Spring of 1858, created throughout Europe the impression that the foreign policy of England would be in a direction favourable to Austria. Events have certainly justified this belief.

Their tenure of office had been but brief, when in "the affair of the Cagliari" Sardinia was made to feel the estrangement of England. It was first manifested in the absurd and disreputable cavil by which England disclaimed the act of her minister at Turin for not following with verbal accuracy the despatch of the Foreign Office—still more so in the final arrangement in which, at a suggestion from Vienna, the

of personal and family aggrandisement, were utterly false. Those who impute to him such designs mistake altogether his character and his ambition. In cordial union with England he has the power as he has the will to achieve much for the interests of mankind. France and England united may defy the world in arms, and may exercise in peace irresistible influence for good. If ever the evil day comes when hostilities exist between the two countries—grievous will be the calamity to Europe and to mankind, but it will not be the fault of the sovereign who sways the destinies of France.

King of Naples was permitted to return the Sardinian vessel to *England* (!!) and so escape a direct reparation to the powers he had wronged.

From the period of that transaction the Sardinian cabinet felt that when the conflict came with Austria they could not rely on the unequivocal support of England, in that which to Sardinia must be a struggle of life and death.

Under these circumstances Sardinia had no choice. Fortunately for her very existence she strengthened her alliance with France, and cultivated friendly relations with Russia—the two powers who at the congress of Verona supported the House of Savoy against Austria.—(See page 54).

Again when war became inevitable, and it became of importance to have either a moral or a material guarantee for the neutrality of Germany, England stood aloof. An understanding with Russia was the only resource left to France.

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## CHAPTER I.

General Statement of the Question—Influence of Austria—Prevalent Misrepresentations of the Italian Question—True Origin of the War in the Policy of Austria—Deadly Antagonism between Liberal Institutions in Piedmont, and Despotism in the Austrian Dominions—This Antagonism the Origin of the War—Necessity to Sardinia of Alliance with some Great Power—Why not with England?—Lord Malmesbury's Despatches—True meaning of English Neutrality—The English People never will consent to go to War to uphold Austrian Dominion in Italy.

THE events of Villa Franca do not supersede the object of addressing these pages to the English people, in the earnest hope that they may, in some small degree, contribute to the formation of right opinions upon the subject of that struggle which exists perpetually in the heart and soul of the Italian nation, and which found one of its expressions in the contest recently waged on the plains of Northern Italy.

They are so addressed in the solemn conviction that it is still of the deepest importance to the great interests of human freedom, and the interest of England, that the English nation should form a just

opinion upon the Italian question in general, and upon the origin and circumstances of the recent war. That war did not commence in any desire of aggrandisement on the part of Sardinia, or any ambitious projects of France, but in a treacherous and criminal attempt of Austria to crush Sardinian freedom. It had its remoter origin in the criminal and despotic tenacity with which Austria has persisted in principles of government which can only produce misery and discontent. Austria has not only acted on these principles in her own Italian provinces, but has enforced them on other Italian States. In the review of Austria's Italian policy, steadily persevered in from 1815 to the present year, it is shown that this policy consisted in the fixed determination to crush every movement in any Italian State to admit free principles into its government. Since 1848, Sardinia has persisted in constitutional government, and, therefore, the hatred of Austria to Sardinia has been one of extermination. So far as Austria and Sardinia were concerned, the contest was one between liberal government and despotism. Austria insisted that all Italy shall be governed on despotic principles—Sardinia claimed her right to have free institutions. That these

are the principles involved in the Italian question, it is the object of these pages to prove. The evidences that establish it are conclusive—they are drawn from Austrian documents, and from the admitted facts of Austrian history in Italy.

Recent events do not make it the less necessary that these proofs should be laid before the people of England. The Italian cause is one that must depend for its ultimate success upon its justice. Its victory must, in the end, be that of opinion.

It is evident to the friends of Italian freedom, that every effort is made, by the partisans of despotic power, to misrepresent the nature and incidents of the struggle, and to turn away the sympathy of the people of England from the Italian cause. Austria has powerful influence in Europe. Her immediate interests are bound up with those of many of the financiers of the world. Whatever be the opinion of the German nation, too many of the German courts, with their wide-spread alliances, feel for the great German power, even for her domination over her Italian provinces, the sympathy of race. In every country of Europe the friends of the absolute system



of Government, the enemies of popular rights, have a secret leaning to Austria, as, in their eyes, the great "conservative" power of Europe, the country of Metternich, and the centre of the Holy Alliance. Against the attempt to wrest from Austria her Italian dominions, or curtail her Italian influence, all these influences are more or less actively arrayed. All those whom interest, or ignorance, or sympathy of political opinion attracts to the side of despotic power, are the partisans—too often the unscrupulous partisans—of Austria. In this, as in every contest in which the passions and prejudices of men are deeply engaged, efforts are made by misrepresentation to pervert the truth. No effort is spared to prevent the expression of the real feeling of the people of England. National antipathies, that ought long since to be forgotten, are evoked—the fears of the timid are practised on by the terrors of an invasion. The whole object and character of the war which France and Sardinia waged in Italy are misrepresented. Sardinia, nobly struggling for her own existence—assailed because she dared to maintain free institutions beside the most intolerant of despotisms, is represented as originat-

ing a war "under false pretences," and carrying on an unprincipled system of ambitious aggression. The French Emperor, who entered on war as the protector of an ally unjustly assailed, is said to have originated it in order to form a league of France and Russia against England!! Everything, in a word, that the reckless insolence of aristocratic partisanship could suggest, to deprive the cause of freedom of the sympathy of the free people of this country, was industriously circulated. Against all these influences the friends of Italy are imperatively called on to appeal to truth and to the justice of her sacred cause.

As Englishmen love justice—as they value free institutions—as they sympathise with the struggles of the oppressed—as they would not have the influence of their country exerted to perpetuate the rule of the oppressor; by every consideration that comes home to the hearts of freemen—the sacred, the indestructible cause of Italian freedom and Italian independence appeals to the judgment of the English nation.

The war between Austria and Sardinia was not one thought of yesterday, but a war which was

the necessary consequence of the relations of the two countries for the last ten years. It began by the march of Austrian armies upon the soil of Piedmont. It originated, as has been already said, in the irreconcilable antagonism between Sardinian liberty in Piedmont and Austrian despotism in the rest of Italy. Both could not co-exist in the Peninsula. The events of history and the records of Austrian diplomacy abundantly testify this great truth, long recognised by every one acquainted with the true state of Italian affairs. While Piedmont had free institutions, the tyrannical rule of Austria in her Lombardo-Venetian kingdom could never be safe. While Piedmont's free institutions were a standing menace to the despotism which under Austrian influence trampled down the rest of Italy, Piedmont never could feel herself secure. No power of diplomacy, no weary tediousness of feeble protocols or despatches, could alter the truth or control or avert the inevitable issue. Either Sardinian liberty, or the system of Austrian tyranny, must fall. Had Austria understood her own interests, she would long since have adopted a liberal policy in her Italian States. Had England

been resolutely true to the cause of liberty, her influence might, in some degree, have enforced this. These, however, were calculations upon which any reliance must have been that of hope rather than expectation. Despotic power and freedom were both too strong in Italy to make it probable that ever that issue would be decided except by the arbitrament of the sword.

This antagonism is the real contest that brought Austria and Sardinia into the conflict of armed hosts. The accessories of this war may have obscured or encumbered the great principle which provoked it. There are those who say that Sardinia has chosen, or been forced to rely on allies that Englishmen do not identify with the cause of freedom. These matters we will presently discuss. But all this cannot alter the truths of the past. It can be shown, indisputably and beyond all question, that Sardinia and Austria were at war, because Austria believed the existence of a free Italian state incompatible with the preservation of her own dominion in the Peninsula; and because Sardinia, resolved at all hazards to maintain—no matter how much the contrast might disquiet surrounding despotism—her civil and religious liberty,

her liberal institutions, her representative government, and her free press.

If Sardinia had not secured the alliance of France, or of some other great European power, there would still have been the war; but it would have long since taken place—it would have been a war in which overwhelming Austrian hosts would have quickly trampled down the last refuge of Italian freedom, or one in which the oppressed populations of the whole Peninsula would have risen to vindicate the outraged rights of humanity in the blood of their oppressors—in deeds, not improbably, of outrage and guilt. A short war between unequal forces, and the imposition of the despotic system on the Sardinian States; or a general revolutionary rising all over Italy; one or other must have been the result of the attitude of the two countries if Sardinia had not sought for and found a European alliance strong enough to protect her when the menaced blow was struck at her existence.

To many a mind the question involuntarily arises, why the English was not that alliance? That question it is not the province of these pages to discuss; enough to say, that *it is not the fault of Sardinia*

*that it was not so.* For the avowed hope of such an alliance, Sardinia sent her troops to do battle in the war which England fought on the heights of the Crimea for European independence. If, after the Russian war, England and France, or England alone, had cordially entered into an alliance with Sardinia, to protect her against all attacks upon her independence, whether openly by arms, or secretly by the unjust extension of Austrian influence over Italy, the result would, in all human probability, be very different now. Sardinia would not have been attacked. It is just possible, that reforms in the government of the minor Italian States might at least have put off the evil day—at worst, the sovereigns of these States would have been left to settle with the just discontent of their own subjects. It is, perhaps, better for the cause of human progress, that events have been otherwise ordered. But if England had maintained that alliance with free and liberal Sardinia, which was cemented in the blood of both nations shed before Sebastopol, this country would hold a place more honoured and respected in the councils of Europe.\*

\* In an extraordinary speech delivered in the House of Lords on the evening of Thursday, the 30th of June, Lord Howden described

It is not the object of these pages to criticise the language of those diplomatic despatches, which fill the ponderous tome in which the platitudes of the foreign minister are gravely recorded as efforts to preserve the peace of Europe. The great merit claimed for them is that they are written with a most praiseworthy indifferentism between the contending

the position which England would probably occupy in Europe as the result of our conduct in this war:—

“At some period, and at an early period, England would step in with the view of stopping hostilities and preventing a greater effusion of blood. She would honestly and ardently offer her mediation, and then by the unfortunate fiat of fate which stuck to her, by that *curiosa infelicitas* which attached to all she did, would make herself only more odious than she now was to all the parties. If she failed, she compromised her name and her position as a great Power; if she succeeded, there would arise a cry from one end of the Peninsula to the other that but for perfidious Albion, who was only alive to her own interests and the dispersion of cotton—(laughter)—Italy would have been free—that she arrested the splendid schemes of the Emperor, paralysed his magnificent intentions—the development of nationalities—and what not; all the fine things elaborated in that clime which was so propitious to human liberty—the Tuileries at Paris—(laughter)—all the vituperation of the Liberals in Italy, of the Reds in France, and of the Radicals in England, would fall on England, and the credit of all those magnificent plans for the establishment of nationalities, which were never intended to be carried out, would be given to France.”

Whatever were the motives of his Lordship in this singular outbreak, he has, although in uncouth and perhaps not very dignified language, conveyed to the laughter of the House of Lords a very

powers. Admirable conception of the true position, and the real interests of England! Austria solemnly complains to a British minister, that Sardinia's pestilent and wicked introduction of free institutions into Italy, rendered the whole Peninsula unquiet and unsafe; and the complaint is received with a silence that amounts to acquiescence.\* In a

important, although it ought not to be a very mirth provoking truth.

England has lost her place in the public opinion of Europe. She is—it must be written—she is believed to have betrayed to dynastic influences the liberal cause. It may be too much to say with Lord Howden that she “has made herself odious;” but unquestionably, two months ago, she was regarded by all Italian patriots as having made herself the partisan of Austrian oppression.

Our transactions in Italy have twice exposed us to the terrible imputation of bad faith. Our European influence cannot afford that we should give occasion a third time for the charge.

\* In his dispatch of the 25th of February, for the information of the British Cabinet, Count Buol attributes all the discontent in Italy, and all the evils that have taken place, “to the introduction of institutions “which work admirably when they have been developed and matured “by ages, but which do not seem adapted by their nature to the “genius, traditions, and social institutions of the Italians.”

In the same dispatch he describes the freedom of Piedmont—“Liberty, as it is understood in Piedmont, is liberty which is almost “license and which is free from any scrupulous respect for the rights “of others,” and “*which is productive of the most serious inconvenience “to neighbouring States.*”

In this memorable document the Austrian minister went further. Pointing out the mischief that had followed from the free press and



struggle between a free and a noble country, determined to maintain her free institutions, and a giant despotism, which conceived that its safety required them to be crushed, the glory of the English minister is that he preserved the language of perfect indifference !

It may add something to our appreciation of the high spirit of such a course, when we remember that but three short years before, England had been engaged in a struggle with the mightiest power upon earth. Gallantly and nobly Sardinia sent her little contingent to aid by their bravery, more than by their numbers, the cause which England represented as vital to herself. Austria—who forgets the conduct

representative institutions of Sardinia, he called on the great powers of Europe “to exhaust the source of the evil by bringing Piedmont “to a more moderate appreciation of her international rights and “duties ; to prevent by their united efforts the Cabinet of Turin from “continuing that policy of *provocation* in which, *abusing the tolerance “of Europe*, it had persisted for years.

In this language there is no mistake. The Austrians demanded that discontent should be suppressed in Italy—not by concessions in the despotic states, but by crushing free institutions in Sardinia.

Count Cavour rightly interpreted this proposal when he described it as one “to force Sardinia to modify her institutions and by stifling “liberty in Piedmont to make Lombardy, Venice, and the other States “of the Peninsula tranquil.”

Sir James Hudson truly stated in a despatch, presently to be quoted

of Austria in the Russian war? Austria, the secret enemy of England, whose treacherous neutrality no friend of European freedom ever should forgive! Between the generous ally and the insidious traitor—between Austria claiming the right to crush free institutions in Piedmont, and Sardinia, in defiance of her power, determined to maintain them—between these two nations and these two causes, a British minister thrusts his volunteered and officious interference, and boasts that he preserves an honourable indifference—an indifference, however, which strangely finds its expression whenever the opportunity offers, in fulsome professions of attachment

that the “provocation” of Sardinia consisted in her possession of free institutions.

But let this fact be pondered on by Englishmen.

The minister of Austria dared to say to the Secretary of the Queen of England that the evils of Italy arose from the introduction by Sardinia of representative institutions into Italy.

That these institutions were productive of “serious inconveniences” to neighbouring States.

And he dared to demand that the powers of Europe, instead of calling on Austria to reform her Italian government, should call on Sardinia to give up that free government which existed only “by the tolerance of Europe.”

To this audacious piece of insolence—to the despatch of Count Buol of the 25th of February, 1859—the British minister gave no reply.

This was the “neutrality” of the English Foreign Office.

and affection for the Austrian government, and in stern and scarcely civil rebukes of Sardinian liberality and independence

All this, however, is now past. England, thank God, is uncommitted to the cause of European despotism. Austria herself, by the invasion of Sardinia, invoked the arbitrament of war, and the issue of battle has made at least the Lombard people free from her iron yoke.

In the hostilities waged in Italy, the English nation, it must be confessed, did not feel that duty called on them to interfere. In this sense, the people of England adopted the sentiment of neutrality. But this "neutrality" has been made to cover another and a very different sentiment, in which the people of England do not share. The people of England did not adopt that indifference between the contending principles, which was but another name for a treacherous support of Austria. The cause of freedom is sustained by the sympathies of freemen, and to withhold these sympathies is a crime. The English nation desire to see Sardinia continue free and

independent. Earnestly do we wish to see the whole Italian Peninsula enjoying those blessings of liberty and self-government, which in ten short years have made the little state of Piedmont a great nation. Our warmest wishes are with every struggle for liberty. Our neutrality meant that we were not prepared to draw the sword in the quarrel, but it means nothing more.

Even still it is of vital importance that it should be distinctly understood, that never will the free English nation consent that one pound of British treasure, or one drop of British blood be squandered to maintain, directly or indirectly, or in any degree, the hateful rule of Austria in Italy. We have not taken up arms to drive the Austrians out of Italy; never, never—will we take them up to keep them there. No matter what complications may arise, no English bayonet shall ever be plunged into the breast of one Italian patriot struggling for the expulsion of the Austrians from her plains or fortresses; or one Magyar hero fighting for the independence of his native land. England knows her duty too well to embark in war as the champion

of oppressed nationalities, but England's sympathies are with them ; and when the time comes that our influence may properly and legitimately be exercised, it shall most assuredly be so in favour of liberty, and against the dominion of despotic power.

That the completion of the arrangements so strangely inaugurated may leave any opening for this, it is not, perhaps, easy to ensure. Yet it seems difficult to conceive how the proposed confederation can be carried out without a reference to a congress, in which the voice of England must have its influence.

If this be so, most assuredly every English statesman, and the English nation at large, should approach the question with the conviction that no settlement can give tranquillity to Italy, or secure peace for Europe, except one that, even if Venetia be left to Austria, will emancipate all the rest of Italy from that Austrian influence which, both to sovereigns and subjects, has been the fruitful source of unnumbered ills.

If the proposed Italian confederation be so regu-

lated as to preserve Austrian influence in Italy—the arrangement is one that will involve the Peninsula in protracted struggles of misery and blood.

These are questions upon which, in congress or out of congress, England must express her opinion, if she does not choose to forfeit all place and influence in the councils of Europe. Manifestly, however, it is impossible consistently with the respect due to international obligation to arrange a settlement like that indicated at Villa Franca without a reference to the opinion of assembled Europe. Precedents and reason alike forbid it, and Prussia and England are called on to intervene, and demand the assembling of a congress.

Well would it be for the peace and civilisation of Europe, if such a proceeding were the means of re-establishing cordial relations between France and England, and bringing Prussia to act in concert with them both.

England, at least, is bound by every tie of honour and good faith to express an authoritative opinion upon the proposed settlement of Italy.

## CHAPTER II.

Political Divisions of Italy—Sardinia—Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom—Tuscany—Parma—Modena—States of the Church—Kingdom of Naples—Principality of Monaco—Republic of San Marino—Despotic Government in the Italian States—Bound by Treaties to Austria to maintain it—Tyranny of Austria in Lombardy—Policy of Austria from 1815 to 1848—Influence on that Policy of the establishment of a Free Constitution in Piedmont.

THE first step to understanding the Italian question is to acquire a knowledge of the position and political situation of the sovereignties into which Italy was divided, as matters stood at the commencement of the present war.

A glance at the map of Italy will best exhibit this. It will show Italy divided into seven separate and nominally independent sovereignties :—

- 1st. The Kingdom of Sardinia, or Piedmont.
- 2nd. The Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom of Austria.
- 3rd. Grand Duchy of Tuscany.
- 4th. Duchy of Parma.
- 5th. Duchy of Modena.

6th. States of the Church, including the Legations.

7th. The Kingdom of Naples, or the Two Sicilies.

In addition to these there are two sovereign and independent States—the Republic of San Marino and the Principality of Monaco—dominions too limited to occupy a very distinct position on the map.

The north-western angle of the Peninsula constitutes the Italian dominions of the House of Savoy. These districts in Italy successively acquired by the valour or the address of the princes of the House of Savoy, form the kingdom of Piedmont. To this, at the settlement of 1815, was annexed the republic of Genoa, by one of those arbitrary acts of unprincipled spoliation which disgraced the arrangements of the Congress of Vienna.\* In 1720, the Duke of Savoy

\* Like most acts of political injustice, the annexation of Genoa was the source of weakness not of strength. In 1849 the discontent of the Genoese, and the republican disaffection which that discontent fostered in the troops of Piedmont, largely if not chiefly contributed to the disaster of Novara, and the failure of Charles Albert in the war of independence.

Among the achievements of the liberal government of the last ten years, Victor Emanuel can proudly point to the present state of feeling in Genoa, and the attachment of the Genoese to his crown.



acquired the island of Sardinia in exchange for the Sicilian crown, and from that time the island has given its name to the monarchy, of which the Italian State of Piedmont is the centre.

With a population in all her provinces of not more than five millions, this little kingdom has taken a place of power and influence in the councils of Europe, which she owes to the spirit of her sovereign, the freedom of her institutions, and the bravery of her people.

Over all the rest of the Italian Peninsula the spirit of Austrian despotism exercised directly or indirectly its influence. In that portion of Northern Italy which lies between the Ticino and the Adriatic, the rule of Austria is direct. Her Italian possessions consisted of the Duchies of Milan and Mantua, forming together the kingdom of Lombardy, and in addition to these the country which was the territory of the once celebrated Republic of Venice. The entire province was usually termed the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom.

To the two first the claim of the House of Hapsburgh dates from the peace of Utrecht in 1713. For nearly 200 years before that period the Duchy of Milan had been a dependency of the Spanish Crown.

By the peace of Utrecht it was annexed to Austria. The same treaty confirmed her in the possession of Mantua, which she had seized during the war. Her first possession of the Venetian provinces arose from the cession of them by the 1st Napoleon in 1796, a transaction to which impartial history has assigned the character of "the most unprincipled bargain of the revolutionary war."\* Over these magnificent districts, the finest portions of Europe, with soil of unsurpassed fertility, with cities of unrivalled splendour, and inhabited by a population of five millions, Austrian government was direct.

The Grand Duchy of Tuscany occupies a portion of Italy which lies on the shores of the Mediterranean, extending nearly from the Southern boundary of Piedmont to the States of the Church.† It is one of

\* Lord Brougham's *Political Philosophy*.

† The Grand Duchy of Tuscany now includes that district which, by the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna, constituted the separate Duchy of Lucca. By a singular arrangement in that treaty, the Empress Marie Louisa, the widow of Napoleon, was to enjoy the Duchy of Parma during her life. Upon her death, the Duke of Lucca was to succeed to Parma, leaving Parma to be united to Tuscany in future.

A short time before the death of Marie Louisa, the Duke of Lucca anticipated the arrangement, in 1847, by surrendering Lucca to Tuscany, in consideration of a pension to be paid during the life of Marie Louisa. Since 1847, Tuscany and Lucca have been united.

the most powerful of the Italian States, possessing a population of nearly two millions. The Grand Duke, who, since the commencement of the present war, has left his capital for the second time, is a prince of the House of Hapsburgh.\*

North of the Appenines, between the Duchy of Tuscany and the river Po, are situated the smaller principalities of Parma and Modena; each of these is a Duchy possessing a population of about 500,000. The Duke of Modena, who, like the Grand Duke of Tuscany, was an Austrian Prince or Grand Duke of the Empire, was the mere serf of the country to which his allegiance was due. He was maintained in his dominions by the imperial troops. The wisdom that guided the policy of this little state may be understood from the fact that it has never recognised a French sovereign since the expulsion of Charles Tenth. In Parma the reign of the late sovereign had been marked by atrocities which recalled all that history records of the most cruel and most licentious of the Cæsars. When the just revenge of an assassin rid the

\* Leopold, the grandfather of the present Grand Duke, was the second son of the Empress Maria Theresa—her eldest son was Joseph the Second, of Austria.

world of this monster, his widow, as Duchess Regent, assumed the supreme power. Her mild administration, while it relieved them for the present, could offer to the people no security against the repetition of the worst excesses of despotic power, and her spirit of independence could not prevent Austrian influence from being as paramount at Parma as at Florence or Modena. One of the most violent acts of Austrian aggression—the formation of an entrenched camp at Piacenza—took place within the territory nominally subject to her rule.

The centre of Italy, from sea to sea, is occupied by that aggregate of principalities, ceded at different times to the See of Rome, which constitutes what is termed “the States of the Church.” Over these the Pope is supreme temporal ruler. “The eternal city,” and the neighbouring district of the *Commarca* are the immediate seat of the Apostolic government. The provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, Forli, and Ravenna, are each governed by a Cardinal Legate, and are popularly known as “the legations.”

Ferrara we shall presently see was seized by an Austrian garrison in 1847, in defiance of the strong

remonstrance of the Papal court. The garrison was placed there to overawe the liberal tendencies of Pius the Ninth. In the rest of the legations Austria has placed her garrisons since 1849; while a concordat, entered into between Austria and Rome, if it has surrendered all liberty in Austria into the hands of ecclesiastics, has given Austria at the same time paramount influence at Rome.

The southern extremity of the Peninsula forms the kingdom of Naples, unhappily too notorious by the tyranny of its monarch. Including the island of Sicily, this kingdom has for its subjects a population of about 8,000,000.

It is scarcely necessary, in enumerating the strength of Italian States, to mention the Republic of San Marino, with its population of 7,000 and its territory of 17 square miles; or the still smaller Principality of Monaco, with its 5,000 population, and its one town. These little states are only interesting, as in Italy the sole remnants of a former state of things, which have escaped the changes and demolition which marked the close of the end and the beginning of the present century. San Marino alone remains of the once proud Italian republics; and Monaco enjoys,

with, perhaps, one exception, the honour of being the smallest sovereign state in Europe.

The little Principality of Monaco lies on the shores of the Gulf of Genoa, not far from the frontiers of France and Piedmont. The municipality of San Marino has its independent Government in the centre of the Province of Romagna in the dominions of the Pope. It is now nothing more than the depository of those municipal archives which record the days when the Sovereign Republic of San Marino was acknowledged by haughty Venice as her dear sister.

Leaving Monaco and San Marino out of consideration, as exercising no influence beyond the parochial boundaries which enclose them, it is not too much to say, that throughout the whole of the States above enumerated, with the exception of Sardinia, the system of government, at the commencement of the present year, was despotism in its worst and most unmitigated form—despotism maintaining itself by the most zealous espionage and the most ruthless oppression. Against the tyranny of their rulers the people have been for years combined in secret associations. The discontent and disaffection of their

subjects aggravated the despotic system of the rulers. In most of these States the government was one of the gallows and the dungeon; in all of them it was one of the spy and the police. Civil and religious liberty were alike unknown. The persecution of the Madaii by the Duke of Tuscany was but a sample of the system pursued throughout the Peninsula. If the atrocities of the King of Naples have excited the indignation of the civilised world, it is not because they have been worse than those of other Italian potentates, but because by accident they have been exposed. The Neapolitan system is the Austrian system of Italian government; and Austrian influence virtually ruled all these States.

These States were, in fact, mere fiefs of Austria. The Sovereigns of most of them were upheld on their thrones by Austrian bayonets. They had bound themselves by treaty to Austria never to grant free institutions to their subjects; and Austria, in turn, engaged to send them, at any time, a military force to suppress any insurrectionary expression of discontent on the part of those subjects. This was the actual political position of Italy at the commencement of the present war.

Austria, in the very language of these infamous treaties by which Sovereigns bargain with a foreign nation against their own—Austria expressly justified these stipulations by the necessity of not permitting in Italy Governments based upon principles different from those on which his Imperial Majesty administers the affairs of his Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. Austria maintained her dominion in Lombardy by a system of oppression as cruel as any now practised on the face of the earth. The noblest Lombard was liable to be dragged from his family on secret information, at a moment's notice, by the police. In one short year, in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, nearly one thousand capital sentences were pronounced against persons whose only crime was having arms. An indiscreet applause at a theatre—nay, the refusal to be present when commanded, has been deemed an act of insurrection, and exposed men of birth and station to the ignominious corporal punishment of the stick. The passing stranger in Milan or Venice saw that the whole population was crushed down by the bayonets of the military, and by the police. Austria believed this system essential to the maintenance of



her dominion in Italy; but she also believed, with more truth, that such a system could not last with the example of free institutions in any neighbouring Italian State; and hence it is, that at a cost which was rapidly reducing her finances to beggary, she maintained those alliances by which she bound the petty tyrants of Italy never to ameliorate the condition of their subjects, and bound herself to supply troops to enable them to suppress their own people.

The position of Sardinia, therefore, has been of late years that of the only Constitutional State in Italy, standing alone against a number of States with despotic forms of Governments, all leagued together, not by treaties among themselves, but by the common tie of subservience to a foreign Government. History records nothing like this abnormal state of things. The Austrian system in Italy was in itself one which it required the genius in despotic arrangements of a Metternich to devise. It made the Emperor of Austria the grand master of a secret conspiracy of Sovereigns against freedom. When complicated by the fact that this conspiracy was confronted by one Italian State that was both free and independent, it presented a state of Italian affairs unparalleled in the his-

tory of the world—a state of affairs, which every one acquainted with the true state of Italy knew perfectly could only find its solution in an Italian war. From Austrian blindness and obstinacy it was hopeless to expect those concessions which alone could avert that result.

With the adoption of the arrangements of the treaty of Vienna this system commenced. Between 1815 and 1848, Austria, in violation of the spirit, if not the letter of that treaty, acquired by secret stipulations a commanding power over States supposed by its provisions to be independent. It never was intended that Austria was to become the mistress of Italy by converting the Italian sovereigns into her fiefs. The ink was not dry on the public treaty of Vienna when Metternich commenced by a secret treaty with Naples to inaugurate that system of policy which, up to this hour, Austria has steadily pursued. It is, however, since the period of 1847 and 1848 that the positions of Austria and Sardinia in Italy have become defined. In 1848, Sardinia abandoned, for a free constitution, that despotic form of government which she had hitherto shared with the other Italian States. At the same time, in every part of Italy, there was the effort to

obtain free institutions—that effort was followed by a general and almost combined attempt of all the states to get rid of Austrian domination, and vindicate the independence of their country. Both efforts failed: in 1849 despotic government was re-established in every State except Sardinia, and Austrian influence was more firmly and openly secured.

The events of these years were, in fact, the conquest of Italy by Austria. Piedmont alone has preserved her independence; and her subjugation, either by diplomacy or arms, has been the unceasing object of Austria ever since. In estimating, then, the present position of Austria and her opponents in Italy, the events of 1847 and 1848 must not be overlooked.

These are of importance enough to demand a separate chapter for themselves.

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## CHAPTER III.

EVENTS OF 1847, 1848, AND 1849.

Accession of Pius the Ninth to the Pontificate, June, 1846—Reform Spirit of the new Pope—Amnesty for Political Offences at Rome—Remonstrances of Austria—Armed occupation of Ferrara by Austria—Remonstrance of the Pope—Policy of Austria—Description of it, from the *Times*—Reforms in Tuscany and Sardinia—Duke of Modena refuses all Reforms—Supported by Austrian Troops—Intrigues of Austria to foment Disturbances—Speech of M. Thiers in the French Chambers—Constitutions granted in Sardinia, Tuscany, Naples, and Rome—Insurrection in Milan and Venice—Charles Albert invades Lombardy—Success of the National Cause—Its Reverses—Withdrawal of the Sanction of the Pope—Retirement of the Neapolitan Contingent—Evacuation of Milan—Armistice—Re-establishment of Despotism in Naples—Royal Massacres in Naples and Sicily—Flight of the Pope, of the Duke of Tuscany—Desperate Condition of the National Cause—Battle of Novara—Abdication of Charles Albert—Occupation of Rome by the French Troops—Re-establishment of Despotic Government throughout Italy.

IN the history of the Papacy the most curious chapters will probably for ever be those which record the first two years of the Pontificate of Pius IX. Among the rulers of Italian States the first impulse to reform and Italian nationality proceeded from the Vatican. The Sovereign Pontiff of the States of the Church was the first Italian Prince who did anything to raise the standard of freedom and Italian independence.

On the 16th of June, 1846, Cardinal Mastai Ferretti, the present Pontiff, ascended the pontifical throne under

the title of Pius IX. An amnesty for all political offences signalised the commencement of his reign. This measure was an offence against the Austrian system of government, then bearing almost universal sway in Italy. Followed by some rejoicings on the part of the Roman people, and a little afterwards by some liberal, although insignificant, concessions on the part of the Pope, it amounted to an unpardonable crime. Austria became alarmed. Her ambassador at Rome remonstrated with the Pope; these remonstrances were couched in language against which the Papal Court with truth protested as insulting and disrespectful. The remonstrances assumed the form of threats. The Priests in the Austrian dominions were forbidden to mention in their service the Pope's name in terms of praise; and, finally, on the 17th July, 1847, an Austrian army entered the Pope's city of Ferrara, in spite of the strong remonstrances of the Papal authority.\* Indignant at this violation of international law, the

\* Ferrara is a town in the Papal dominions, situated on the southern bank of the Po. A fortress is built close to, but separate from, the town.

The treaty of Vienna reserved to the Emperor of Austria the right of "garrisoning the *place* of Ferrara."

Austria had exercised this right by keeping a small force in the

Papal Court adopted the course of protesting against it *through the Notary Public of the Holy See*. The Austrian ambassador complained of this as a mode unprecedented in diplomatic proceedings, and attempted to justify the seizure of Ferrara in a note to all the powers of Europe, of which the reasoning was on a par with the temper and good taste.\*

citadel or fortress, the only position to which the word place in the treaty of Vienna could apply.

On the 17th of July, 1847, in a time of profound peace, the inhabitants of Ferrara were alarmed by the appearance of an Austrian force of six squadrons of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and a small detachment of artillery, with three field pieces. On crossing the Po, they arranged themselves in order of battle—orders were given to load their muskets and field pieces and march on Ferrara. In place of directing their course, as usual, to the fortress, they paraded up and down several of the principal streets with their artillery matches burning.

Such was the account of the transaction communicated by the British agents to the Foreign Office. The principal portion of these troops remained quartered in the town.

The Papal Government rightly protested against this military occupation of the town as an act of invasion, totally unwarranted by the provisions of the treaty of Vienna.

For this invasion of the town of Ferrara, the cabinet of Vienna has never been able to assign any intelligible reason different from that to which both the Papal Government and all Italy attributed the act—that desire to overawe the Pontiff, and to give effect to the remonstrances which, simultaneously with this act, Austria addressed to him against the liberal policy he pursued.

\* The King of Sardinia immediately proffered to the Pope the protection of an army of 10,000 men. There is little doubt that this offer was made in consequence of a communication from the Papal Court.

In the revolutionary tumult which soon after disturbed, these events of 1847 have been forgotten. It is now, however, of importance to refer to them, as showing the policy upon which Austria then, as now, avowedly acted, *that of suppressing every symptom of liberal policy in any Italian State by force*. It is not possible to bring this before the mind more clearly than by the following quotation from one of the great chronicles of public events, recounting the impressions and the events of the time. In the *Times* of the 28th of March, 1857, occurs the following description of Austria's policy to the Pope. Let Englishmen ponder every word of it, and remember that the policy of Austria is now the same. She has made the maintenance of Italian despotism the necessary condition of her own existence in Italy.

“ The opposition of Austria has been constant and  
 “ intense from the moment of his election. The  
 “ spectacle of an Italian prince relying for the main-  
 “ tenance of his power on the affectionate regard and  
 “ the national sympathies of his people, the resolution  
 “ of the Pope to pursue a course of moderate reform,  
 “ to encourage railroads, to emancipate the press, to  
 “ admit laymen to offices in the state, and to purify the

“ law, but above all the dignified independence of  
“ action manifested by the Court of Rome, have filled  
“ the Austrians with exasperation and apprehension.  
“ There is not the least doubt that the Cabinet of  
“ Vienna is eager to grasp at the slightest pretext for  
“ an armed intervention South of the Po. If such a  
“ pretext do not occur, it is but too probable that it  
“ may be created, and any disturbances calculated to  
“ lead to such a result would at once betray their  
“ insidious origin. Meanwhile, the Pope is menaced  
“ in Austrian notes, which have sometimes trans-  
“ gressed the limits of policy and decorum. The minor  
“ princes of Italy are terrified by extravagant intima-  
“ tions of hostile designs entertained against them by  
“ the national party, headed by the Pope and the Prince  
“ of Savoy, in order to persuade them that their only  
“ safeguard is the Austrian army. These intrigues  
“ may be thought necessary to the defence of the  
“ tottering power of Austria South of the Alps, for  
“ every step made in advance by Italy is a step towards  
“ the emancipation of the country.”

This is the testimony of contemporary history to the policy of Austria in the beginning of 1847. It must be remembered that no revolutionary spirit then alarmed the potentates of Europe for their thrones.



The events of 1848 were unforeseen. The throne of Louis Philippe, the Napoleon of Peace, was supposed to rest upon an unassailable foundation. No rash reformer, no violent anarchist led the way. The Pope and the College of Cardinals inaugurated these dreaded reforms. The reforms themselves were not violent or democratic. Pius the Ninth had done nothing more than show his wish that his people should be treated with equity and justice. He had dared to encourage railroads! to emancipate the press!! to purify the law!!! to pursue a course of moderate reform!!!! He had dared to do this on Italian soil—that soil which Austria had consecrated to despotism. When these things would not be tolerated in the Pope—does any Englishman believe that they could be endured in the Sardinian king.

The example of the Pope was followed by two Italian States. Tuscany and Sardinia inaugurated reform. Peacefully and tranquilly were popular concessions made to the subjects of the sovereigns of these states, and if Austria had not enthroned herself in Italy as the demon of misrule, the regeneration and freedom of Italy would have been the work of Italian hands.

On the 8th of February, 1848, Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, carried out the reforms already inaugurated, by granting to the people that free constitution which has never been revoked. On the 14th of the same month, the sovereign Pontiff granted the Roman people representative institutions.\*

In the summer of 1847 the Austrian ambassador at Turin directly threatened the King of Sardinia with the entry of Austrian troops into his territory if he dared to carry out his projected reforms. In July she followed up this policy by seizing on the town of Ferrara in defiance of the Pope. In the same year the subjects of the Duke of Modena had petitioned for reform. He answered

\* These reforms in Piedmont were not carried out without provoking the most violent remonstrances from Austria, and the same threats which she had addressed to other Italian States. It was the violence of these threats to the Italian reforming sovereigns that induced the English Government to send Lord Minto on his much misrepresented mission. In the instructions given by Lord Palmerston to Lord Minto the threats to Sardinia are thus mentioned :—

“ You will say that Her Majesty’s Government have learned, with no less surprise than regret, the official communication which has been lately made by the Austrian minister at Turin to the Sardinian Government, and which seems to imply a threat that the Sardinian territory would be entered by Austrian troops if the King of Sardinia should, in the exercise of his undoubted rights of sovereignty, make certain organic arrangements within his own dominions, which would be displeasing to the Government of Austria.”

*Letter of Lord Palmerston to Lord Minto, September 18th, 1847.*  
Parliamentary Papers on Italy, 1849, No. 123.

them by the threat of 300,000 Austrian bayonets. And Austria showed herself ready to respond to the threat, by sending her troops to quench the reforming aspirations of the inhabitants of Modena in their blood. On the 22nd of December, in spite of the strong remonstrances of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Modena was occupied by Austrian troops. A guard of honour at the funeral of the Duchess Maria Louisa, about the same period, supplied the pretext of seizing on Parma by a similar military occupation, and under a similar protest.

The outrage to the Pope occurred some months after the description of Austrian policy already quoted from the *Times*. Every sentence of that, as it may well be designated, remarkable and sagacious state paper, was verified by the event. Austria did set herself against every effort of Italian sovereign or people to improve or reform. She did teach the petty princes of Italy to rely on her army as their protection against their own subjects; she found the pretext for armed intervention in the affairs of Italy south of the Po; she verified even the last and blackest part of the prophetic indictment; for it is established by evidence beyond doubt that she sent her paid emissaries to create the republican and

revolutionary disturbances which drove the Italian princes, the Pope among the number, to her armies for protection.\*

When the true history of 1848 is written, it will be found, to an extent far greater than is suspected, that the intrigues of Austria against reform in Italy, in 1847, had much to do with the revolutionary outburst, in other parts of Europe, of the succeeding year.† These are subjects of which

\* The fact of Austrian plots to foment insurrection, in order that Austrian armies might be sent to repress it, does not rest solely on the evidence of the papers stated to have been discovered at Milan, referred to in the next note.

In a despatch dated from Paris, on the 3rd of February, 1848, Lord Normanby stated his belief that one of the plans resorted to by Austria had been "to excite the extreme party in Italy to anarchical demonstrations against the government, and thereby to place the sovereigns in the position to seek safety either in flight or in foreign assistance."

Lord Minto wrote the same intelligence from Rome. In the same despatch, Lord Normanby observed that "the conduct of Austria within her own dominions *could not be different if dictated by a deliberate intention to provoke the population to revolt.*"

† It is of importance to note the dates. In 1847, Europe was perfectly tranquil. It was the period, in fact, of Mr. Cobden's notorious declaration that nothing could disturb its peace.

In 1847, the first concessions were made to their subjects by the sovereigns of Rome, of Tuscany, and Piedmont.

To this period, the testimony quoted from the *Times* newspaper applies. Austria was then determined to use all her influence to prevent the most moderate relaxation of the iron system, by which the Holy Alliance had decreed that men must be ruled.

It is stated on high authority, that documents, among those unde-

the discussion is beyond the limits of this rapid sketch. In 1848, the reforms conceded in Tuscany, in Rome, and in Sardinia, were followed by moderate demands to their Austrian masters on the part of the Milanese. The revolution in Paris, and the disturbances in Vienna, had then inflamed the hopes of the Lombards. Insurrections in Milan and Venice drove out the Austrian troops. Even Naples followed in the wake of reform. The king granted a constitution, to which he swore. It was, however, then, as now, a patent political fact that Austrian influence in Italy was utterly irreconcilable with freedom in the Italian States.

destroyed when the Austrians were driven out of Milan, in 1848, establish the fact that Austria resorted to the policy indicated in the masterly sketch of the *Times*. There is no reason to doubt that at one period at least of the contest, she employed her spies to disseminate the doctrines and excite the spirit of what was then termed red republicanism, with the object of embarrassing the advocates of free institutions, and terrifying from their cause the sovereigns who had given to it a reluctant and wavering assent. In the feeling which then prevailed the appeal to democracy was a dangerous game for the upholders of despotism to play.

It must also, in point of date, be borne in mind that the complete concession of representative government in Piedmont was not caused by the excitement of the French revolution. The proclamation of Victor Emanuel announcing the "statute," is dated the 8th of February, that of the Pope, conferring something like a parliament in Rome, is dated on the 14th.

The French revolution broke out on the 24th. A few days before it did so, no one dreamed of danger to the dynasty of Louis Phillipe. His downfall took Europe by surprise.

It may, perhaps, be more truly said that, among the causes which

The liberal cause in Italy was then, as now, that of hostility to Austria. Charles Albert entered the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom to expel from Italy the enemies of the cause alike of national independence and of free government. The movement apparently was a national one of United Italy, in which both sovereigns and peoples concurred. Tuscany and Naples sent their contingents to swell the army of independence. The King of Naples ordered his fleet to the Adriatic to succour the insurgents at Venice; and the Pope, from the balcony of the Quirinal, blessed the band of volunteers who left Rome to join the patriot ranks.

contributed to his downfall, was the belief that his Italian policy sympathised with Austria.

On the 31st of January, M. Thiers brought the affairs of Italy before the French Chambers in a speech, a few quotations from which will recal the position which Austria occupied towards Italian freedom at the time :—

“When Italy now looks forth for hope, it is not to France that she directs her regards, a misfortune alike for her and for us.”

“You have not done in Italy what you might have done. I have admired with what address you have dissembled the real question. Remodelling of territory is not the point at issue. We do not call on you to overturn Italy, but to cause treaties to be respected. Why are the Austrians at Modena? The treaties of 1815 forbid it. Cause them to be respected. You will tell me the Italians will not find that enough. . . . Doubtless those who suffer demand more, but cause treaties to be respected, for that will be something. At Turin, at Florence, at Rome, where the people, I must say, are not too exacting, why do the sovereigns concede so little, *because they live in fear of the intervention of Austria. It is the sword of Damocles suspended over Italy.*”

The rapid successes of that army it is not necessary minutely to record. By the end of May, the fortress of Peschiera had surrendered, and the victory of Goito drove the Austrians beyond the Mincio. The beaten Austrians implored the intercession of England, offering to surrender Lombardy on condition of being permitted to retain their sovereignty over the Venetian States.

Within a few months all was changed. The first blow to the national cause was an encyclical letter from the Pope of the 29th of April, in which he disavowed a sanction of the war against Austria.\* The next, the withdrawal of the Neapolitan troops in May. Charles Albert was not only left to maintain the cause alone, but to maintain it with the disadvantage that attends the withdrawal of that which had been made indirectly its rallying cry. In

\* Every allowance must be made for the position of the Pope. In the College of Cardinals the influence of Austria was supreme. Indiscreet and unauthorised use had been made of his name, and proclamations had been issued by some of the commanders of the Roman troops inconsistent with the character of the Pontiff as the head of the Church. Finally, the Austrian government obtained a petition or remonstrance from the Austrian bishops, addressed to the Pontiff, in which the dangers of his hostility to Austria were pointed out, among them that of leading to a schism in the Church.

Under such influences it was that Pius the Ninth issued the encyclical letter of the 29th of April, 1848.

the summer months, the Austrians retrieved their reverses. Before August, the Sardinian King had evacuated Milan; and on the 10th of that month an armistice was signed, which left future details to be settled by the mediation of France and England.

Events rapidly followed each other still more disastrous to the cause of Italian freedom. Early in summer the treacherous King of Naples celebrated his resumption of absolute power by a slaughter of his people. The efforts of the Sicilians to assert their rights to the constitution which England had guaranteed to them, had been crushed by still more hideous massacres. The withdrawal of the Pope from the national cause was followed by discontents at Rome, and disagreements with the representative assembly he had established. In the assassination of his minister, Count Rossi, in November, a hideous crime removed from him the only counsellor who might have been able to reconcile Roman freedom with his pontifical rule. This soon was followed, in November, by his flight to Gaeta, where he was thrown into the arms of the King of Naples, a prince in whose character there was that combination, anomalous, but not uncommon in all religions,



of intense perfidy and cruelty, with the most superstitious devotion to his Church. The Grand Duke of Tuscany followed the example of the Pope, and joined him at Gaëta. The Sardinian king himself with difficulty coped with the rebellious spirit evoked in his territories. To crown the calamities of the cause of independence, it was understood that, after refusing in summer to interfere on the basis of freeing Lombardy but leaving Venice to Austrian rule, England in the changed circumstances of the Italian cause\* had pledged herself that the basis of all negotiation must be an adherence to the territorial arrangements of 1815.

In March, 1849, Charles Albert resolved to strike the last blow for the Italian cause. In chivalrous despair he led his army to the field. The campaign lasted but three days, and on the fatal battle field of Novara was struck down his last hope of freeing Italy from the Austrian yoke.

\* When this offer was made to the English Cabinet, the Venetian people had freed themselves from Austria by force of arms.

What right would any English Minister have had to make their return to slavery the condition of Lombard freedom. England's taking part in such an arrangement would have been regarded as one more betrayal of the populations, whose hopes of freedom she had animated.

But in dealing with Austria, it must not be forgotten that in 1848 she offered to surrender the kingdom of Lombardy in Italy.

In vain he sought upon that field a soldier's grave. Upon the evening of that day, without notice or consultation, he assembled his officers, and in their presence resigned his crown to the son who had nobly shared the dangers of that disastrous day. Without returning to his capital he hurried from the field of his defeat. Never more was he seen in Piedmont; a few months sufficed to give him that rest in the grave for which he had passionately prayed in the last charge of Novara.

The Roman Republic did not long survive. The Pope from his exile had appealed to the Catholic princes to restore him to the sovereignty of the Church. French troops replaced the Pontiff in the Vatican, and have since maintained him there. The Dukes of Parma and Modena, who had been driven out by their people in March, 1848, had been previously reinstated in their dominions by Austrian arms. The Duke of Tuscany, recalled by his own subjects, had re-entered his capital in Austrian uniform. The reign of despotism was re-established in every portion of the Peninsula, save one. All the sovereigns of Italy except one now held their territories under the protection of the Austrian armies. Sardinia was the

only State in the Peninsula that was not virtually a fief of the Imperial Crown. The Kaiser Koenig was the Suzerain of Italy.

Thus in bloodshed and terror had Austria, rising from reverses that seemed fatal, re-established in Italy the rule of that policy which had for its leading object to crush the attempt at free institutions in any Italian State. After a vain, because half-hearted struggle to free themselves from their chains, all the sovereigns of Italy, except the King of Sardinia, had once more become the vassals of that policy. The terms of their vassalage were well understood. They did homage to the Austrian despot for their dominions; their feudal service was to keep their own subjects slaves. They were tyrants by tenure, and held their sovereignties on condition of suppressing popular right.

To accomplish this, was long before the settled aim and object of Austrian policy, as will appear manifest, nay, confessed, or rather boastfully put forward in Austrian documents, when we rapidly review the Italian proceedings of Austria in the interval between 1815 and 1846, from the Congress of Vienna to the accession of Pius the Ninth.

## CHAPTER IV.

Austrian Policy from 1815 to the Congress of Verona—Secret Treaty with Ferdinand, King of Naples, with Tuscany—Constitution granted to Naples in 1820—Daring Declaration of Metternich to Duke of Modena—Conference at Troppau—Congress of Laybach—King of Naples summoned to attend—His solemn Declaration to his Parliament—Naples invested by Austrian Troops—"Neutrality" of Lord Castlereagh—Proclamation of the Duke Regent of Naples—Overthrow of the Constitution and Re-establishment of Despotism—Constitution granted in Piedmont by Charles Albert, Prince of Carrignano, as Regent of King Victor Emanuel, disclaimed by Charles Felix—Liberty suppressed by Austrian Troops—Declaration of Austria at Congress of Laybach—Threat of War upon any Italian Sovereign that would grant Free Institutions—Threatening Letters to the Kings of Naples and Piedmont—Despatch of Metternich to French Court—Complete prostration of Italy.

THE sketch of Austrian proceedings in the twenty years which intervened between the Congress of Vienna and the accession of the present Pontiff, ought naturally to have preceded the narrative of the events of 1848. Those latter events, however, effected such a change in all the relations of the Peninsula, that it was more convenient to place them in the foreground.

Immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Vienna, Austria placed herself in the position which she has ever since maintained, of being the stern

repressor of every attempt at freedom in any part of Italy. Joachim Murat, the Bonapartist King of Naples, had, through the influence of Austria (to whom he had rendered aid in betrayal of his old master), been permitted to retain his revolutionary throne in the arrangements of 1814. In 1815, Ferdinand Fourth was recalled to the throne of his ancestors by the voice of the people, who had not found in the usurper a constitutional king. The stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna settled him on that throne.

The provisions of that treaty, it need scarcely be said, made no regulation as to the internal affairs of the states whose external relations it arranged. The internal administration of every state was left to its own control. In the restoration of the Bourbon, there was a double chance of constitutional government in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. England was pledged to preserve to Sicily her ancient constitution, and in the proclamation which Ferdinand had addressed to the people, he had pledged himself that his government should be one in which "The people  
" will be the sovereign, and the monarch will only be  
" the depository of the laws which shall be decreed by  
" a constitution the most energetic and desirable."

Against the peril of free institutions attending his restoration, Metternich guarded by an expedient as simple as it was base. As the condition of supporting his pretensions, Austria imposed upon him a separate and second treaty with herself, by which the wretched monarch bound himself never to tolerate any form of government inconsistent with the principles upon which his Imperial Majesty conducted the administration of his Italian provinces. This treaty was secret—it was years afterwards when it was brought to light. It was a fraud upon every power that was a party to the open treaty of Vienna—it was especially a blow at the honour of England, pledged by good faith to see the Sicilians restored to their ancient constitution; it was, above all, a fatal blow at the honour of the Neapolitan sovereign, and the tranquillity of his kingdom. It degraded that monarch to the condition of a serf of Austria—it degraded him still more by compelling him to break his word to his people. To that fatal treaty are directly to be traced all the miseries which have since made Sicily and Naples the byword of all mankind.\*

\* So palpable were the efforts and motives of Austrian influence in Italy, that they are recorded even in the matter-of-fact pages of the

Such was the inauguration of Austria's policy after the settlement of 1815. In the following year, a similar treaty gave her the effectual control of Tuscany. By this treaty the Grand Duke entered into a league by which the Emperor and the Grand Duke bound themselves mutually to concert together in all times measures for the repose and tranquillity of the whole Italian peninsula. At the same time pledges were exacted from the Duke of Tuscany to the same effect as that formally embodied in the Neapolitan treaty.

Within one short year after the Treaty of Vienna, Metternich had thus established Austrian influence and securities for despotism in the preponderating states of both northern and southern Italy.

*Annual Register.* The writer of the history of the events of 1820 observes of the king of Naples:

"Hitherto he had taken no step to fulfil his promise, deterred, no doubt, in part, by his own aversion and that of his ministers to change, but still more, perhaps, by the influence of Austria, who was so apprehensive lest the example of a free government in one part of Italy might endanger her possessions in Lombardy, that, in a secret treaty with Naples signed at Vienna in June, 1815, it was expressly stipulated that his Neapolitan Majesty should not introduce in his government any principles irreconcilable with those which were applied by Austria in the government of her Italian provinces."—*Annual Register*, p. 233.

In 1820 the establishment of a constitution in Naples gave Austria the opportunity of reducing to practice her theories of her Italian right. No violence or even tumult disgraced the Neapolitan movement of that year. The army and the people concurred in demanding from Ferdinand the constitution which he had solemnly pledged himself to grant. The king, with but little hesitation, complied with the request. But, bound by his secret compact with Austria, he attempted at once to meet the wishes of his subjects, and evade the obligations of that disgraceful treaty. He declared his son, the Duke of Calabria, Vicar-General of the kingdom, and the following day the Vicar-General granted a constitution. The King and the Vicar-General both solemnly swore to maintain it; and without the shedding of one drop of blood, without one single outrage or one act of violence to any human being, a free system of government was established at Naples.

There is nothing in the history of mankind more melancholy or more disgraceful than the proceeding by which this movement of Naples to liberty was crushed. Austria at once proclaimed her hostility to the liberties of Naples. A letter is still



“ it might remain fixed for ever on the bases,” which he specified. They were in the words of this memorable proclamation :—

“ 1st. That the individual and real liberty of my  
“ beloved subjects may be secured by a fundamental  
“ law of the State.

“ 2nd. That birth shall confer no privilege in the  
“ composition of the legislative body of the State.

“ 3rd. That no taxes shall be imposed without  
“ the consent of the nation by its legitimate represen-  
“ tatives.

“ 4th. That the accounts of public expenditure  
“ shall be referred to the nation itself, and its repre-  
“ sentatives.

“ 5th. That laws shall be made with the consent  
“ of the national representatives.

“ 6th. That the judicial power shall be independent.

“ 7th. That the press shall remain free, except  
“ from the operation of laws enacted against the  
“ abuses of its liberty.

“ 8th. That the ministers be responsible.

“ 9th. That the civil list shall be fixed.”

With these solemn and probably, for the time, sincere professions, the Neapolitan King left his

capital to go on board an English frigate. The result of the Laybach Congress was that the three despots determined to attack Naples. It was resolved that an Austrian army should invade the Neapolitan territory, unless the order of things established since the preceding July were abolished. Even in the event of submission, the troops of Austria were to occupy the country until the old mode of things was re-established. The King was compelled to write to his son, whom he had left as regent in his absence, that the determination of the allied sovereigns was irrevocable. The Parliament of Naples, however, prepared for resistance. A manifesto was issued by the Regent, the King's son, protesting, in the most solemn manner, against the attempt to interfere with the liberty of Naples to regulate her own affairs, appealing to Europe against the oppression of the Court of Vienna, and finally declaring that if a war of extermination was unavoidable, "the Prince Regent and his august brother would place themselves at the head of the national army and fight with it to the last extremity against the foreign invasion, invoking the help of the Supreme Ruler of empires, who

‘ protects the cause of right and punishes the abuses of “ power, injustice, and oppression.” Austria, however, persevered, and, after a faint show of resistance, the Neapolitans were compelled to surrender to the overwhelming force that was marched against them ; on the 24th of March, 1821, the Austrian troops entered the capital. The Parliament of Naples was dissolved. The King wrote from Florence advising submission as the only course. On the 15th of May, he re-entered his seat of government ; the constitution was destroyed, and under the coercion of Austrian bayonets, despotism was re-established, and instead of a Government conducted on the principles for which the King had pledged himself to struggle, the Government of Naples became—that which it is now.\*

And yet while indignation at the recent enormities of that Government was excited against the

\* In the above sketch—the view is taken which is on the surface of the public documents—that the King of Naples acted in good faith, and was sincere in his declarations to his parliament and his people. Similar credit is given to the solemn manifesto of his son.

If, however, the contrary opinion be the correct one—if the King's conduct were hypocrisy, and the coercion of the Congress of Laybach a solemn and concerted fraud—this aggravates the baseness of Austria's conduct. It is indeed among the evils of her Italian system that it has left few states in Italy in which the sovereigns were not governing in strict violation of their own solemn oaths. It had,

royal criminal who has been just called to a tribunal where kings find no favour, Englishmen do not scruple to use words of compliment to the power whose heartless and bloody intrigues are responsible for all.

This was the Congress of Laybach, which was cited by England's foreign minister as a precedent to be followed in the proposed conference on Italian affairs. The King of Sardinia was to be privileged to attend upon the same footing as the King of Naples was admitted to Laybach.

At the preliminary conference of Troppau the late Marquis of Londonderry, then Lord Stewart, represented the liberal opinions of England, and his brother Lord Castlereagh. Motions were made in the British

in the minds of the people, identified monarchy with treachery, perjury, and fraud. Victor Emanuel alone has untaught that lesson.

Even were it true that the constitution of 1821 in Naples and Piedmont may have been forced from these sovereigns, this is no excuse for the conduct of Austria. Where would be the liberties or the monarchy of England, if upon each occasion when some concession was wrung from a king, there had been a congress of tyrants to discuss its propriety, and an overwhelming army to enforce their decrees?

In the case of Naples, however, the solemn proclamation of the Duke of Calabria, when the Austrian troops were approaching the city, gives beyond all doubt the invasion the character of an attack both upon the King and the people.

Parliament upon the subject, but Lord Castlereagh was able to boast that he had observed "a strict and honourable neutrality." The English ministers had even expressed their dissent from the invasion of Naples, as on the other hand they had blamed the King of Naples for permitting the revolution. Their despatches were not as voluminous of those as the present day; but they were equally decided in their expressions of neutrality, and in leaving, as far as England was concerned, the Austrian despot to have his wicked will of the Peninsula. A Bourbon was then on the throne of France, and the strict and honourable neutrality of the English Ministers ended in their permitting the violation of the Treaty of Vienna, the occupation of Naples by the Austrian troops, and the forcible subversion by foreign interference of the free institutions which the Neapolitan sovereign and nation had established.

Large bodies of Austrian troops continued to hold the Neapolitan territories. They were paid for at the cost of the countries they were brought to oppress. In 1822, at the Congress of Verona, Austria agreed to reduce her troops in Sicily and Naples to 17,000 men.

Thus was the attempt at freedom in the South of Italy crushed by Austrian intervention and military force. About the same period it was her fortune under almost similar circumstances to prevent the establishment of free institutions in the North.

In Piedmont the King Victor Emanuel had, like his brother of Naples, bound himself, not by treaty, but through assurances given by his minister at Vienna, that he would not grant free institutions to his people. In 1821 a popular movement demanded the Spanish constitution. The King adopted a device not unlike that of Ferdinand, but with more unmistakeable evidence that he was sincere. Instead of a temporary delegation of his royal powers, he abdicated his crown, and appointed Charles Albert, Prince of Carrignano, Regent in his room. The Regent, amid the universal acclamations of the people, granted the constitution.

The Royal and Imperial conspirators of Laybach could not tolerate freedom in Piedmont any more than in Naples. The Emperor of Russia, assuming that the Austrian troops would be occupied with Naples, gave orders for the formation of an army of Italy to march 100,000 men upon Turin. The

Emperor of Austria at once placed 15,000 men upon the banks of the Ticino.

Despotism had the pretext of legality for suppressing liberty in Piedmont, which they had not in the case of Naples. Victor Emanuel, when he appointed the Regent, accompanied that appointment by his own act of abdication. It was forgotten, that by the very act of abdication the crown devolved upon the king's brother, Charles Felix. A proclamation from him, dated from Modena, refused to recognise the acts of the regency, and the Austrian troops, returning from their easy victory at Naples, placed him on the throne as an absolute monarch, with more semblance of legitimate right than could be alleged for their invasion of Naples.

Twelve thousand Austrian troops continued to occupy the Sardinian territories until the end of 1823; at that time they were withdrawn in accordance with the desire of the Sardinian monarch, expressed at the Congress of Verona. During their occupation the whole of the expense was levied upon Piedmont.

Transactions like these need no comment. Were it necessary, it would be supplied in the language of

Austrian statesmen. At the Congress of Laybach, Metternich openly avowed the policy of his court to be the prevention, by force, of the establishment of free institutions in any part of Italy.

His audacious letter to the Duke of Modena has already been mentioned.

There is a letter on record in the Foreign Office at Turin, in which the Sardinian representative communicates some of the details of the Congress. Metternich did not hesitate openly to avow the principle that Austria would not tolerate representative institutions in any Italian State. In reply to a question, what would be the case if the King of Naples wished to establish a representative system, "*In that case,*" replied Metternich, "*the Emperor will make war upon the King of Naples.*"

To France the same policy was, unquestionably, avowed.

In a despatch to the Austrian ambassador at Paris, dated 6th March, 1822, Prince Metternich observed:—

“ THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM, WITH THE INSTITUTIONS WHICH NECESSARILY RESULT FROM IT, CANNOT AND OUGHT NOT TO BE ESTABLISHED IN ANY STATE OF THE PENINSULA.



“ If, in a time such as ours, an enlightened  
 “ government ought to regard its own internal  
 “ administration as its chief duty, still it cannot so  
 “ completely shut itself up within its own geo-  
 “ graphical limits as to regard with indifference the  
 “ agitation or repose of neighbouring States. This  
 “ was the case with Austria in the events of 1820  
 “ and 1821.”

It would seem, however, that Austria did not implicitly trust the sovereigns either of Naples or Piedmont. Nor did she scruple to remind them both in peremptory terms that they held their thrones as her vassals, and must follow her policy and obey her commands.

To the King of Naples, after the partial withdrawal of the Austrian troops, the Emperor wrote a letter with his own hand, in which he expressed “ his fixed and  
 “ unchangeable determination to exact the strict and  
 “ entire observance of the secret treaty of 1815, con-  
 “ firmed by the promises recently repeated by the  
 “ King,” while he offered “ the support of the whole  
 “ force of the Austrian empire, always in readiness to  
 “ be brought to bear upon any place in which the  
 “ first symptoms of disorder and revolution should  
 “ appear.”

The reply of Ferdinand is one of the meanest submissions in which kingly power ever bowed itself to superior force.

To Charles Felix, who had not so completely surrendered his independence, the communication of the Imperial wishes was not quite so peremptory, and was made through the Sardinian ambassador at Vienna. The ambassador did, however, convey the following gentle intimation from Prince Metternich:—

“The Austrian Cabinet is far from believing that it should be influenced, as it is said, by the spirit of the age. It is convinced that war between monarchy and liberalism, between social order and democracy, is a war to the death—it must terminate by the annihilation of one or the other. The Austrian Cabinet is convinced that any idea of accommodation is absurd, and that any government which gives up any portion of its authority, is only supplying the arms that will wrest from it what remains. It is as far from its thoughts as from its intention that in the neighbouring States there should be founded institutions which may weaken the kingly authority, which, far from this, Austria desires to see strengthened and established on an indestructible basis.”

Such was the language which Austria held to those

whom the treaty of Vienna had made independent sovereigns of Italian States. Everywhere, in the language of the Imperial letter, the whole force of Austria was ready to be brought to bear against the sovereign or nation in which any symptoms of that liberalism would appear. The sovereign who would dare to give free institutions to his people must be prepared to see his territories occupied by Austrian soldiers, and to have his country fined in the cost of the occupation. There was nothing to check her power except the support which France and even Russia, however opposed to liberal institutions, were disposed to give to the independence of the House of Savoy. Lord Castlereagh was Foreign Minister of England. A Tory Parliament believed with Lord Ellenborough that Austria had done good service to England in the revolutionary war—they sympathised with her hatred of liberalism and her love of that despotism which she dignified by the name of social order—and in the British Parliament large majorities defeated every attempt in the House of Lords and Commons to obtain an expression of opinion upon the true nature of the “dignified” and honourable neutrality” of Lord Castlereagh.\*

\* In 1823, in one of his greatest speeches—that on the Address of that year—Mr. Brougham thus spoke of “strict neutrality” between

The result was what might have been expected. Throughout the whole of the Peninsula the terror of the Austrian arms prevailed over sovereign and people. Even Pius VII. became alarmed at the promised assistance of Austrian armies in preserving the peace in the States of the Church, and the Cardinal Legates were earnestly entreated to keep the strictest order in their Legations, lest the slightest disturbance might give the Austrians a pretext for reoccupying the Roman provinces with their troops.

In the words of contemporary history, "Italy reposed in tranquil slumber under the Austrian dominion, for from the Alps to the southern extremity of Sicily, the will of Prince Metternich, enforced everywhere by the presence of Austrian troops, was a law supreme."

These events were almost immediately followed by a transaction which shows the real value of Austria's pretended respect for treaties and legitimate succession.

the righteous cause of freedom and the iniquities of despotic power :—  
 "I am rejoiced that the ominous words 'strict neutrality' did not escape from the lips of either the mover or seconder of the address.  
 "A state of declared neutrality on our part would be nothing less than a practical admission of those principles which we all loudly condemn,  
 "and a license to the commission of those atrocities which we are all unanimous in deprecating."

## CHAPTER V.

*Austria to the Accession of Pope Pius IX.—Congress of Verona—Proposal to alter Piedmontese Succession—Defeated by France and England—Subsequent attempt to exclude Charles Albert—Defeated by France and Russia—Endeavour to bind Charles Albert to the cause of Despotism by an Oath—Insurrections in 1831 and 1832—Put down by Austrian Troops—Desertion of Italy by Louis Philippe—Threat of Austria to march on Paris—Representations to the Pope by the Great Powers in favour of Reform—Resistance of Austria—General view of Austrian treatment of the Papal Court.*

IN the beginning of 1822 the state of affairs in Europe had become so menacing to its peace, that a Congress was resolved on, at which the representatives of all the Great Powers agreed to attend.

The Congress was held at Vienna. The Emperor Alexander attended in person ; the King of England was represented by the Duke of Wellington.

The principal object of this celebrated Congress was the discussion of the Affairs of Greece and Spain. Its deliberations as to Italy were confined to the discussion of treaties for the evacuation of Piedmont and Naples by the Austrian troops and to the con-

sideration of a proposal for violently changing the Piedmontese succession, which during these discussions Austria pressed upon the assembled powers.

Charles Felix, the reigning sovereign of Sardinia, had no son. Of five daughters, the eldest was married to the Austrian Duke of Modena, the son of an Austrian Emperor. The Salic law prevailed in Piedmont, and according to its provisions the next heir was the Prince of Carrignano. His conduct as Regent in the constitutional movement had displeased Austria. In the Congress of Verona it was proposed by the Austrian representatives that the Salic law, which regulated the Sardinian succession, should be annulled, and that the crown of Piedmont should devolve, on the death of Charles Felix, on the Austrian Duke of Modena, as the husband of his eldest daughter.

The proposal was defeated by the determined negative of the representatives of France and England.

Baffled in this attempt, Metternich, after the breaking up of the Congress, resorted to fresh intrigues to exclude Charles Albert from the crown. His next proposal was to pass a law of exclusion against himself personally, permitting the crown to devolve upon his son Victor Emanuel, the present

King. At the period of these proposals Victor Emanuel was a child. The suggestion was that the young prince should be taken to Vienna to be educated, to qualify him by a course of Austrian instruction in the duties of an Italian sovereign, to succeed to the government of Piedmont. This plan was defeated by the opposition of Russia and France, neither of whom desired to see Austria mistress of Piedmont.\*

\* The policy of Russia, as well as France, has always been to support the House of Savoy against Austria, in Italy. The intervention of Alexander, in 1821, was directed not against Sardinia but against revolution. In 1816, Prince Metternich pressed on Lord Castlereagh the very modest proposal that the district of the High Novares should be taken from Piedmont and annexed to Lombardy, in order, as he alleged, to complete the line of defence against a French invasion of Lombardy through Sardinia. The opposition of Russia defeated the proposal.

Metternich, with far-seeing sagacity, discerned the weak point in the line of Italian despotism. Failing in his early attempt to alter the territorial arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna, he proposed to guard Austrian influence in Italy by an Italian confederation, which Sardinia should be compelled to join. Lord Castlereagh lent a willing ear to the proposal. Even the newly-settled government of France acted on the instincts of French diplomacy, and supported Russia in maintaining the rights of Piedmont. The Emperor Alexander wrote an autograph letter to the King of Sardinia assuring him of Russia's support in resisting both.

Thus early was Piedmont regarded as the fortress of Italian independence; thus early were France and Russia disposed to preserve, at least, one corner of Italy free from Austrian rule. These traditional policies of great powers sometimes constitute what almost amount to unwritten alliances between nations.

Defeated in both attempts to prevent the dreaded Charles Albert from succeeding to the throne of Piedmont, the restless spirit of Metternich made a last effort to make his future throne unsafe by supplying a pretext under which, if he departed from the despotic system, he might with a show of legality be deprived. His next attempt was to induce Charles Felix to exact from his successor a solemn oath that he would never alter the existing system. This also failed, and on the death of Charles Felix in 1830, Charles Albert succeeded to the throne. There seems something almost supernaturally prescient in the instinct with which the creator and champion of the Austrian system had struggled to prevent that succession. Charles Albert occupied the Sardinian throne long enough to lay the foundation of Italian freedom by giving to Piedmont her Magna Charta of constitutional government, and if in agony he saw the cause of Italian independence struck down on the fatal field of Novara, he left a son to succeed who has nobly justified Metternich's prophetic horror of the House of Carrignano.\*

\* Count Buol surely must have forgotten this transaction, when he had the audacity to put forward to Victor Emanuel the part which Austria took in subverting the Sardinian constitution of 1821, as a claim upon the gratitude of the son of the Prince of Carrignano.



After the events of 1820, a period of ten years of blank oppression was called peace in Italy—a peace, however, not unfrequently interrupted by partial attempts at insurrection and their terrible suppression. In 1831, the “three glorious days” in Paris, and the accession of Louis Philippe to the throne of the barricades, gave hope once more to the patriots of Italy. Insurrections in Parma, Modena, and in the Papal States, were quelled by Austrian troops, and gave pretexts for new occupations and new treaties with the petty tyrants whom Austria kept on their thrones. For these hopeless and therefore mischievous attempts, the excuse of the patriots was that they relied upon the express promise of the government of Louis Philippe, that Austrian interference in the internal affairs of an Italian State should be resisted by French arms. Of this promise, the only trace in performance was the occupation of Ancona by France.

This attempt was made by Metternich with Charles Felix, in 1823. The Sardinian Foreign Office contains the letters of the Piedmontese ambassador at the Court of Vienna, in which his interviews with Metternich on this subject are fully detailed.

It was admitted by Metternich that no obligation on the future king would be legally binding. He compared it to the case of an injunction in a will, which the heir might disregard, but in doing so would expose himself to a curse.

Such are the mean devices which for half a century imposed upon Europe as wisdom.

Austria, from the moment of the deposition of Charles X., had maintained in Lombardy an army of 100,000 men, in readiness to suppress a popular movement in any part of Italy. Large masses of troops were marched south of the Po to suppress the popular movements in Parma, Modena, and the Papal States. The Government of Louis Philippe made some feeble efforts to oppose these interventions, but they were met by the stern declaration of Austria that "the Emperor would interfere, even at the risk of a general war." The French Government may not have been strong enough to undertake the responsibility of a war; perhaps Louis Philippe was already beginning to understand how easily he could take his place in the family circle of absolute sovereigns, although the occupant of a popular throne in France. The ministers of France explained away the lofty declarations in which they had protested that they would resist Austrian intervention, and "the members of the Provisional Government of the United Italian Provinces" issued a proclamation, in which they declared that they surrendered to Austrian force, because "a great nation had abandoned the principle which they had promulgated and guaranteed."

As a compromise with France, the Austrian troops retired from the Papal Legations after the restoration of the Pontifical authority. New disturbances brought them back in 1832; as a set off against their permanent occupation of Bologna, France sent an expedition which threw into the Papal city of Ancona a garrison of 1,500 men.

In 1831 and 1832, after the retirement of the Austrian troops from the Legations, the great powers of Europe united in urging on the newly elected Pontiff, Gregory XVI., the necessity of quieting the discontented people by the concession of moderate reforms. Austria herself was compelled to join in these representations; nevertheless, to her influence it was owing that this advice was followed only by concessions that were a mockery. The new Pontiff was supported against his people by Austrian troops. In the language of one certainly not prejudiced against the cause of Austria—"His reign was a long and often "arduous struggle with the revolutionary liberals, "against whom he was sometimes, at the instigation of "the victorious Austrians, obliged to adopt measures "of rigour little in unison with the native humanity "of his disposition."\*

\* Alison's Europe—7th vol., p. 625.

If the domestic misgovernment of the States of the Church be a scandal to Roman Catholic Europe, let it never be forgotten that to Austrian interference and the domination of the Austrian system we can distinctly trace the evils of the Papal system of Government, as we can those of every Italian State.

Thus Austria dealt with Gregory XVI. Her treatment of his successor is well known. Scarcely had he ascended his throne when she showed him that he must be like all other Italian Princes—her prisoner protected by her troops. In 1847, she attempted, by her military occupation of Ferrara, to overcome by force the liberal tendencies of the present Pope.\*

\* The most superficial acquaintance with the facts of her history is sufficient to convince any one of the utter hypocrisy of Austria's devotion to the interests of the Papal See.

Her treatment of Pius IX. in the early and liberal years of his pontificate has been already stated.

In 1813, when she wished to bind the treacherous Murat to her cause, she entered into a treaty with him, by which she bound herself to add to the territory of Naples—a district with a population of at least 400,000—to be taken from the realms of the Pope.

So true is the declaration of the Sardinian Government to the Piedmontese bishops, that while Sardinia has maintained the interests of religion, Austria has been dealing with the Papal See as the agent of her own political power.

## CHAPTER VI.

**Sardinia from 1840—Accession of Victor Emanuel—Temptation to resume Absolute Power—His noble Conduct in adhering to the Constitution—Sardinian Constitution—Freedom of the Press—Religious Liberty—Church Reform—Contrast between Sardinia and rest of Italy—Admiration due to Sardinia—Character of Victor Emanuel.**

THE year 1849 witnessed the revocation of every constitution granted to an Italian State, but one. The King of Sardinia alone refused to deprive his people of freedom.

On the 30th of October, 1847, Charles Albert granted to his people liberty of the press, a just system of criminal judicature, and a regulated police.\* On the 8th of February, 1848, he gave them the charter establishing representative government. The battle of Novara was fought on the 23rd of March, 1849, and on the evening of that day, amid gloom and despondence, Victor Emanuel succeeded to the sovereignty which his father laid down. Every temptation surrounded him that could induce him to

\* Among the concessions hailed with most satisfaction was one placing the police under the civil instead of the military authorities.

resume absolute power. A large and powerful party in Piedmont urged him to the step. The revolutionary spirit had shaken the tranquillity of his own dominions, and the ingratitude and desertion of the democrats had lost the cause of Italy, and driven his father from his throne with a broken heart. The experiment of free institutions appeared to have failed, and the reactionary spirit provoked by the excesses of the violent had extended to many of those who had been the advocates of the liberal cause. In the eyes of the frightened politicians of Europe, the cause of despotism was that of law and order. Nothing was easier than for Victor Emanuel to have assumed absolute power.\* The victorious power of Austria was his friend and ally if he did so, his enemy if he did not. He was the son of one Austrian princess, and the husband of another. Under circumstances like these it was that the first act of

\* The following true description of his position is from the pen of one of the best informed of recent writers on Italian affairs :—

“ It rested but with himself to have despatched the constitution. “ The clergy—the majority of the nobility, alarmed at the levelling tendencies recently exhibited—the army embittered, since Ramorino’s “ betrayal, against whatever fostered the growth of democracy, would “ all have given him their support ; the commercial and agricultural “ classes, desirous of tranquil times and easy living, and too little

the King was to issue a proclamation, pledging himself to maintain the constitutional franchises of his people, and to continue, let us hope, to perpetuate the freedom of Piedmont.

The determination of Victor Emanuel to maintain the free constitution which his father had granted, places him high in the ranks of sovereigns who have given freedom to their people. The whole conduct of his reign corresponds with that noble commencement.

The history of the ten years that have since passed is that of liberal progress, temperately but steadily carried out. The parliamentary institutions of Piedmont are liberal. The House of Deputies is returned by constituencies composed of every man who belongs to any liberal profession, and every man who pays forty francs in direct taxation. The only condition required in addition is, that the elector should read

“habituated to the exercise of their new privileges, would not have opposed him. Victor Emanuel’s honesty and filial reverence, his confidence in the representations of those eminent men who had initiated the Italian movement, and still thought freedom compatible with order, saved Piedmont from the fate of the rest of Italy. Six days after the defeat of Novara, saw him at Turin, swearing before the assembled senators and deputies to maintain the statute of the realm.”

and write. No disqualification exists by reason of religious belief, either for the elector or the representative. The elections are conducted by the ballot. The deputies are elected for three years, and no property qualification is required.

In point of law, the press is freer in Piedmont than it was in England before the Libel Act of Mr. Fox. In all cases of political libel, the guilt or innocence of the publication is a question for a jury: in the case of libels against religion or against individuals, the judges decide upon the character of the writing, as they did in all libel cases in England in the days of Lord Mansfield. No censorship exists. The publication of a libel subjects, as with us, the publisher to a prosecution; and press prosecutions by the government are as rare in Piedmont as they are in England.

The general provisions of the law resemble those of the Code Napoléon.

Under such institutions, Piedmont has progressed in ten years as rapidly as any nation ever did in the same period.

In spite of the prejudices of a retrograde class of politicians—in spite of the opposition of an intolerant and dominant clergy—religious freedom has been



established. Even at the cost of a contest with the see of Rome, like one of those which marked the struggles of our earlier kings, the unjust pretensions of clerical power have been abated. In the result of one of the most desperate of those struggles, ecclesiastics have been subjected to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals of the country. A law, resembling our own law of mortmain, has restrained the amassing of landed property by the Church; and after violent opposition, while the sacredness of Church property has been respected, its distribution has been reformed, by increasing the salaries of the inferior clergy; an object further carried out by the suppression of some of the sinecure conventual establishments, the revenues of which were dealt with as episcopal and cathedral revenues have been disposed of in the Anglican and the Irish Church.

These reforms were not carried out without long and patriotic struggles, in which the sympathies of all lovers of freedom in Europe were warmly attracted to the Sardinian State.\* They were not carried out with-

\* Who does not remember the feeling which pervaded Europe when the Archbishop of Turin refused to administer to the dying Santa

out difficulties from the reactionary party in Piedmont itself—difficulties overcome solely by constitutional appeals to the people. It is the glory of Piedmont that, under circumstances of unprecedented difficulty and trial, she has proved the power of constitutional government and representative institutions.\* By the honest working of the representative system, Piedmont has, in ten years, consolidated her institutions, established her liberties, and reformed her internal administration in such a manner as to prove to the world that the Italians are not unfit for those institutions of representative government which have made England great and free. The cause of Sardinia has become that of constitutional monarchy on the continent of Europe.

Rosa the sacraments of the church? It is impossible sufficiently to admire the firmness, as well as moderation, with which the Sardinian government conducted itself through all its disputes with the See of Rome—disputes in which she has succeeded in vindicating the independence of the nation against the encroachments of the Papal Court.

\* It should never be forgotten that in 1849, when pressed, by the violence of his parliament, to violate the convention which he had concluded with Austria, and plunge his country into a hopeless war, Victor Emanuel was not provoked into the revocation of the constitution. He met the factious violence of a revolutionary parliament by a dissolution. He appealed, in manly and energetic terms, to the loyalty and good sense of his people. In the new parliament he triumphed.

Let us remember, however, the contrast which for the last ten years has been presented between Sardinia and the Austrian system prevalent in every other part of Italy.

Sardinia had a limited monarchy. The principle of the Austrian system was the despotic will of the monarch.

Sardinia had a parliament fairly and truly representing the opinions of the people. In every other Italian State representative institutions were unknown.

Sardinia had a free press. In every other portion of the Peninsula liberty of speech or writing was denounced as a pestilence and dangerous sedition.

Sardinia allowed freedom of worship and liberty of conscience.\* How much of either existed under the Austrian system, let the persecution of the Madaiai by Lord Normanby's model sovereign of Tuscany tell.

In Sardinia justice is administered equally and im-

\* Among the charges most strongly urged by the clerical party against the government, was the fact that permission had been given to the once persecuted Church of the Vaudois to erect a place of worship within the walls of Turin. This act was actually denounced from some of the Piedmontese pulpits by the more violent of the priests.

partially. Europe has not forgotten the exposure of the procedure in the transactions which, in the profaned name of a tribunal of justice, wreaked the vengeance of the execrable tyrant of Naples upon those noble men whose crime was their patriotism and their truth.

In a word, the narrow streams of the Ticino and the Po have separated countries in which systems the most irreconcilably opposite prevailed. In broad relief upon the Italian soil stood out the contrast between civil and religious liberty and constitutional government, on the one side; on the other, arbitrary power and all the evil influences that could be combined with a system of temporal and spiritual despotism. Austria, by her concordat, had entered into a compact with ecclesiastical tyranny. The same system spread over all the States that were subject to her. Sardinia, while she dutifully adhered to her fidelity to the Roman Catholic religion, had vindicated her national independence, and freed both religion and liberty from the evils that everywhere attend the domination of the Church.

Between two such systems in one country there.

could not be peace. No difference of language separated the freemen of Piedmont from the slaves in Tuscany and Lombardy; no insular position, or even well defined frontier, isolated the land of constitutional monarchy from that of despotic rule. It does not need an acquaintance with the traditional policy of the House of Hapsburgh in Italy to tell us that the very existence of free institutions in Piedmont was a declaration of war against the despotic system which Austria upheld in the rest of Italy, and that unless Austria were willing to liberalise the government of her own provinces, she must, in self-defence, be prepared to destroy Sardinia.

During this period every effort was made by Austria to terrify the king from his course of constitutional government. Menaces were addressed to him, which told him in unmistakeable language that, by persisting in the maintenance of free institutions, he must be prepared to bear all the consequences of Austria's determined hostility. Nor were these menaces confined to words; formidable forces were concentrated on his frontier, and camps and fortresses were placed in territories not belonging to Austria,

and where these military preparations could only be useful for an invasion of Piedmont. A more detailed account of these proceedings belongs to the chapter in which an attempt will be made to trace the conduct of Austria between 1849 and the present year.

It is impossible not to regard with admiration the heroism with which through every vicissitude the Sardinian sovereign and nation have adhered to their liberal policy. Their constitution was not like that of England, the heritage of their fathers, associated with venerable national traditions. Their Parliament dated from 1848. Yet, steadily to the principles of this constitution, amid every threat of external violence and every disquietude of internal commotion, they adhered.

To the king the largest share of this admiration is due. With him adherence to a liberal policy appears a principle of faith. At his accession he rejected all the splendid temptations with which his education, the provocations of a just or at least natural resentment, and his kindred to the greatest of absolute sovereigns, assailed him. He refused to receive the proffered alliance and friendship of great potentates, on

condition of being an absolute sovereign, and dared their enmity for the sake of being a constitutional monarch. Since his accession none has ever accused him of the slightest departure from his word, or attributed to him one act inconsistent with the obligations he voluntarily assumed. At the head of a State, insignificant in extent, and comparatively poor in her resources, he has never yielded the honour of his country or his own to the threats of the most powerful nations. In the cause of civil and religious liberty, he has resisted the domination of ecclesiastical intolerance, and defied the menaces of armed despotism. He has triumphed alike over democratic disaffection and retrograde prejudices at home, and has succeeded in conciliating the loyalty of all classes of his subjects round a constitutional throne. To the dauntless courage with which Victor Emmanuel followed the dictates of his sense of duty—to the inflexible determination with which he adhered to his resolution that he never would recede from the liberal policy he had adopted—these results are due. Let men cavil as they will, the sovereign who has done these things is worthy of all honour. If Austria

succeeded in trampling down Victor Emmanuel and Sardinian freedom, eternal disgrace would attach to the Europe and the age in which it occurred.

Both would have been so crushed, unless Sardinia were prepared, either alone, or with the aid of her allies or of the oppressed population of Italy, to maintain her independence by force of arms.



## CHAPTER VII.

Austria from 1849—Character of Italian Populations unfit for Slavery—Effect of old Treaties and Historic Memories—Effect of French Revolution—Secret Society of the Carbonari—Constant Struggle against Austrian yoke—Change in Italian Politics since 1848—Effect of Free Institutions in Piedmont—Preparations of Austria to crush Sardinia—Representation of Sardinia to the Congress of Paris—Refusal of Austria to submit questions to Congress—Lord A. Loftus's Description of Austrian Preparations in the beginning of 1859—Policy in other States—Murders in Naples in 1849—Massacres in Sicily—Horrors of Neapolitan State Prosecutions—Mr. Gladstone's Letters—Austrian Rule in Central Italy—In the Lombardo-Venetian Provinces—Starvation and Misery of the People—Despatch of Sir J. Hudson describing it—General Review of the Effects of the Austrian System in Italy.

WHILE Piedmont was thus proceeding upon the steady path of constitutional progress, Austria had been consolidating that system of despotism under which all attempts at improvement in the Peninsula was crushed. Count Cavour well described that system :

“ A system which supports itself on the military  
“ *régime*, and of which the results are corporal pun-  
“ ishment, overwhelming taxation, disastrous measures  
“ of finance, and the abandonment to the church of  
“ the most sacred rights of the state and its citizens.’

In the beginning of the present year, the policy of both countries had produced their natural results. No one believed that the existing state of things could last. No one really acquainted with the state of Italy had any sanguine expectation that it could be determined except by war.

It is impossible to conceive a more utter misrepresentation of the habits and feelings of a nation than is contained in the statement of Count Buol, that free institutions are unsuited to the genius, the habits, and the traditions of the Italians. The truth is, that all these combine in rendering them altogether unsuited to be the subjects of despotic forms of government. The attempt to impose despotism upon them has kept Italy in disturbance for the last fifty years, and to use the language of the British Minister at Florence, has made "the name of Austria execrated throughout the entire Peninsula."

No country in Europe can recur to so many proud traditions of those independent municipalities which in the middle ages preserved the spirit of freedom. The republics of Venice and of Genoa maintained their independence to the period of the French revo-

lution. Northern Italy is studded with cities—republican in ancient times—which scarcely diminished their freedom, and did not lose their independence in selecting as their princes the members of some of the powerful families of their vicinity. A thousand years ago almost all the principal towns of Northern Italy were independent, with republican, or, more correctly speaking, aristocratic institutions in each. In process of time, these commonwealths became principalities, but with scarcely a change in their constitution—and whether republics or principalities, they transmitted from age to age that haughty spirit of patrician freedom which is of all others the spirit most difficult for tyranny to repress.

Italy, in fact, combined whatever in the feudal and in the municipal systems of Europe, was most likely to foster the spirit of national and local pride which most resents an oppressive, above all, a foreign yoke. The petty principalities which established themselves in a great part of the Peninsula relied for their very existence on that spirit of feudal attachment and clanship which makes any people the most difficult to be subdued. That some of these chiefs may have been tyrants did not neutralise the spirit which the

very existence of these separate chieftaincies involved. It was not easy to crush the spirit of independence of the Highland clans, although many of the Highland chieftains were tyrants and oppressors of their clans.

The French revolutionary war, while it swept away the ancient institutions, did not, and could not destroy the spirit of pride and independence which they had made one of the elements of the nation. The subversion of their principalities and their republics, could not take from Italy the memories of the past—memories which, in an excitable and imaginative people, live in the hearts of successive generations as the poetry of freedom. Memories, indeed, which maintain a spirit which the reality would not evoke. The deserted halls of Venice, and the traditions of the Queen of the Adriatic, stir in the breast of the Italian a feeling very different from what the actual experiences of the government of the republic would have caused.

In Italy, as in other parts of Europe, that revolution had disseminated the principles of democratic freedom. These principles long survived the presence of the armies who had taught them. They were not

extinguished by the events in which, unhappily for mankind, the French appeared as the oppressors of nationalities. They were not crushed by the restoration of an absolute system of government, which on the downfall of the French empire the representatives of terrified sovereigns imposed upon Europe.\* In no part of Europe were, or are, liberal opinions more prevalent in all classes than in Italy. National independence and constitutional government are the strong passions of the Italian heart.

Upon such a nation the Congress of Vienna imposed arrangements which Austrian craft succeeded in making the yoke of her own despotism. The foreign tyranny enforced in the Peninsula became intolerable. Secret societies spread over the land. In the dreaded Carbonari were enrolled, at one time, 640,000 men, in whom, in the words of Sir Archibald Alison, "were to be found nearly the whole genius, intelligence, and patriotism of the land." Revolutions or attempts at revolutions have periodically

\* In speaking thus of the results of the Congress of Vienna, it is just to bear in mind that their deliberations were precipitated to a close by the reappearance of Napoleon in France. If the descent from Elba had not startled the assembled congress, many of its worst concessions to despotism would never have been made.

occurred in every Italian state, and the life of Italy, from 1815, has been, on the part of the nation, one long and fevered struggle to be free.

We have seen how Austria met this—how she bound the powers of the Peninsula in a league against that people; how she held vast masses of troops in readiness by overwhelming force to crush any attempt at revolt from her system, either on the part of a sovereign or a people. Under such a system it was impossible for Italy to be tranquil. The elements of freedom in Italy are indestructible. The peace of Austrian tyranny would only be secured by the annihilation of the Italians.

It has, however, already been remarked, that in 1848 an event occurred which made an important change in the relations between Austria and Italian freedom. That event was the establishment of representative and free government in Piedmont. The existence of a constitutional monarchy steadily maintaining regulated liberty is a fact in the political condition of Italy, the effects of which cannot be too highly estimated. Austria had no longer to maintain her system against the unauthorised revolts of insurgent populations, but against the legitimate authority

of an Italian prince. The new peril was the most formidable. Nothing could be more fatal to her tyranny than the vicinity of a state in which freedom co-existed with order and peace, in which the prosperity that followed parliamentary government gave the lie to the slander which described the Italian people as unfit for representative institutions, and in which a constitutional sovereign, maintaining his kingly authority, taught the lesson to princes, that in Italy a king who relied on the affectionate attachment of an emancipated people, and a throne surrounded by free institutions, could be secure.

Upon the feelings and projects of Italian patriots, the change effected in the last ten years is great. The result of the experiment of constitutional monarchy has not been lost on them, and they on their part have learned the lesson that monarchy is not inconsistent with freedom and liberal institutions. The Carbonari were republican, and, in the condition of Italy, we must not wonder if they regarded kingly institutions as incompatible with its freedom. The distrust of monarchy which existed in 1849 paralysed the efforts of Charles Albert. It was reserved for the reign of Victor Emanuel to revolutionise this feeling,

and to rally round the cause of constitutional monarchy the hopes and affections of the Italian people.

In this new position the continued success of free Government in Piedmont had gradually placed the Italian cause. There was but one way of meeting this novel danger—Piedmont must be terrified or wheedled from her new system of Government. We have already recorded the demands which, from time to time, were made upon her, whenever an opportunity presented itself. Since the termination of the Russian war Austria has been preparing herself for the blow that was to crush Sardinia by force of arms. She had treaties with Tuscany, with Parma, and with Modena, which bound these states at all times to permit the passage of her armies, and thus, for all strategical purposes, made them part of her dominions. These treaties were only valuable to attack Piedmont. Her preparations did not rest in securing these advantages of surrounding Piedmont with territories which were Austrian for the purpose of assault. Even in 1856 she had surrounded Piedmont with fortresses and troops. In the representation of the Sardinian Ministers at the Congress of Paris to



France and England, the position of Austria was thus described:—

“ That power holds, in military occupation, the  
“ greater portion of the valley of the Po, and of  
“ Central Italy. Resting on one side on Ferrara and  
“ Bologna, her troops extend as far as Ancona along  
“ the Adriatic, which has become as it were an  
“ Austrian lake. On the other side, mistress of  
“ Placentia, which, contrary to the spirit if not the  
“ letter of the treaties of Vienna, she labours to  
“ transform into a fortress of the first order, she  
“ has a garrison at Parma, and is preparing to extend  
“ her forces all along the Sardinian frontier, from the  
“ Po to the summit of the Appenines. These perma-  
“ nent occupations of Austria of territories which do  
“ not belong to her render her absolute mistress of  
“ nearly all Italy, destroy the balance of power  
“ established by the treaty of Vienna, and are a  
“ continual menace to Piedmont.”

This was the complaint of Sardinia in 1856. The Sardinian Court desired that the subject might be submitted to the friendly arbitration of Europe, complaining bitterly of the expense which the threatening attitude of Austria imposed upon her finances.

France and England supported the Sardinian ministers in the wish that the Congress of Paris should endeavour to adjust the relations between that State and Austria—Austria peremptorily refused.

For two years and a half the government of Vienna steadily persevered in their menacing preparations, of which the Sardinian Cabinet complained. Her garrisons, in all the places which she had usurped, were strengthened and increased. Entitled, by the Treaty of Vienna, to garrison the entrance of Piacenza—she abused, as in the case of Ferrara, the right, by erecting detached fortresses, and thus forming on the confines of Sardinia an entrenched camp, in which she stationed a large force. On the summit of the Appenines, in the Duchy of Tuscany, she had placed an army which commanded the extreme point of the Piedmontese territory by the sea. In the beginning of the present year, she had flung into Lombardy an army of 100,000 men, and even from Vienna Lord Adolphus Loftus warned the British Government that “the great military preparations of  
“ Austria in Lombardy were of that magnitude as not  
“ to leave a doubt that they had been dictated by  
“ other causes than that of providing an ordinary and

“ sufficient guarantee for the maintenance of order  
“ and tranquillity in the Austrian-Italian states.”

This was the external policy of Austria from 1848. With ruthless pertinacity of purpose, she had made her preparations to destroy Sardinia at any moment at which the state of European affairs would offer the prospect of making the attempt with success.

What had been her policy, either in those States which she had assumed control over, and for whose misdeeds she is answerable, or in the dominions which are the subject of her direct rule ?

Everywhere the semblance of liberty was crushed. In some places the attempt to obtain it had been avenged by retribution that surely calls the vengeance of heaven on the powers that sanctioned it.

In Naples the perjured tyrant who verified the character of perfidy and cruelty, which belongs, like hereditary insanity, to every Bourbon descendant of Philip V., not content with the slaughter which mercenary troops would perpetrate—set loose the Lazzaroni on his capital—and consigned the best and noblest of his people to the horrors of the pillage, and the rapine that would attend the sack of a city in a servile war. The scenes of horror that marked the triumph of the

King in Naples, and over which the royal miscreant gloated, are indescribable. "This is my turn for a "demonstration," he cried, as in his fiendish exultation he flung off the mask of hypocrisy by which, in the hour of their strength, he had imposed upon his people. This inhuman speech was his reply to entreaties that he would stop the effusion of blood. The French Admiral Baudin, whose fleet was in the Bay, at last interfered, by a threat that if these horrors were continued, he would, at all hazards, end by force the outrages that were disgracing human nature.

In Sicily—ill fated Sicily, to which England, in 1812, had guaranteed a constitution, and which England, in 1847, had excited to revolt—the atrocities of despotism were true to the ancient traditions of the soil. There is nothing in the history of the Sicilian tyrants of old more hideous than the massacres which attended the bombardment of Palermo, and the sacking of Catania—deeds of perfidy and blood, of which popular freedom in the Southern Peninsula has, one day or other, to settle with Neapolitan tyranny the account.

A more atrocious act still than even these military executions has been the slow and wasting process of

that which is blasphemously called the administration of justice in Naples.

Eight years have now elapsed since the accidental visit of a British statesman to Naples, which was the means of bringing to light the crimes of the Neapolitan Government in relation to their State prisoners. To Mr. Gladstone belongs the noble glory of having revealed the atrocities of the dungeons and the tribunals. Far above the fame that belongs to the first orator of the British House of Commons—far beyond the triumphs of the successful financier, is his claim to the admiration of freemen, which is founded on the publication of those letters which excited against the Austrian system of government in Naples, the indignation of the civilised world.

Europe then heard with amazement that after all who had perished in the massacres, or died by the hand of the executioners, the Neapolitan dungeons contained nearly thirty thousand political prisoners—that more than one-half of those who had formed the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies were among the number—that in the indignant language of Mr. Gladstone, the Neapolitan system “was incessant, systematic, deliberate violation of the law

“by the Power appointed to watch over and maintain  
 “it,” “violation of human and written, for the purpose  
 “of violating every other law unwritten and eternal,  
 “human, and divine,” “the perfect prostitution of the  
 “judicial office which has made it under veils only  
 “too threadbare and transparent the recipient of the  
 “vilest and clumsiest forgeries got up wilfully and  
 “deliberately by the immediate advisers of the Crown,  
 “for the purpose of destroying the peace, the freedom,  
 “aye, and if even not by capital sentences, the life of  
 “men among the most upright, virtuous, intelligent,  
 “distinguished, and refined of the whole community ;”  
 “the savage and cowardly system of moral as well as  
 “physical torture through which the sentences ob-  
 “tained from the debased courts of justice are carried  
 “into effect.”

That attempted confutation of the statements of  
 Mr. Gladstone in reality was a complete confirmation  
 of their truth.

It is not possible to go through the list of these  
 enormities. It is not without its use to mention that  
 between 1849 and 1851, 286 priests were flung into  
 the dungeons of Naples, charged with political offences.

Eight years have these statements been placed

before Europe. Austrian influence has been predominant in Naples, and to this hour no attempt has been made to improve the government, or reform the administration of the law.

These have been the results of Austrian rule in the south. If throughout Central Italy the efforts of 1848 were not avenged with equal ruthlessness, it is not owing to any forbearance of Austria—in all the Central States her influence has reversed the short-lived constitutions of 1848, and drawn back the sovereigns to the institutions which by their own reforms they had condemned. Everywhere discontent and wretchedness has followed the restoration of despotic government.

In her own dominions she pursued that system of oppressive police—of extortionate taxation—of military despotism, which has perpetuated and increased the hatred of every Italian to her rule. The result was the misery of the entire population. The British Minister at Turin relied on that wretchedness as the only security against revolt; he described the inhabitants of Lombardy as sunk even to that last grade of wretchedness in which poverty had deprived them even of the energy to rebel.

“ Seven years,” says Sir J. Hudson, writing to Lord Malmesbury on the 17th of January, “ Seven years of bad wine crops, silk crops, and heavy taxation, have reduced the Northern Italians to skin and bone. Any traveller must have remarked the rags of the peasant, the worn-out horses and carts, and the absence of gentlemen’s equipages on the Corsos of Milan, Brescia, Vienna, and Bologna. The Sardinian Government knows as well as I do that if they pass the Ticino they will find empty treasuries, a famished people, and few resources.

“ That they will find the entire population with them, I have no doubt, but that population is in the starved condition I have described.”

Such have been the results of Austrian rule in Italy ; such have been the curses which she has squandered over the entire of the Peninsula for the sake of maintaining her own miserable rule over the provinces in which she has not settled, but encamped. We have seen her extending her influence over every Italian state, repressing any attempt on the part of the people to extract concessions from their sovereign, and every disposition on the part of any sovereign to concede reforms to his people. We have seen her



steadily adhering to the one policy of hostility to anything like freedom in Italy, and to carry out that policy, bringing to bear upon every Italian court all the influence of diplomacy and intrigue, of intimidation, and of force. We have seen her endeavouring to rid Italy by artifice and intrigue, of the only line of princes from whom she dreaded opposition to her views; and when Piedmont became free in spite of her we have seen her, gradually hemming in that country with vast military preparations for a final and exterminating assault. To attain her darling object of preserving Italian despotism she has not scrupled to falsify all her professions, political and religious; she has made war upon kings; violated the independence of states; she has attempted to set aside legitimate sovereigns; and to abrogate the Treaty of Vienna in its arrangements, both of territory and succession; nay, she has not shrunk from a military occupation of the patrimony of St. Peter, to overcome, or, if necessary, coerce by force, the reforming tendencies of the Pope. Everywhere the stern guardian of despotism; in every place her steps are marked by crime on the part of the rulers—discontent and misery on the part of the people.

This is the Austrian system of rule. She chose the moment which she supposed to be that of England's alienation from the liberal cause, to throw down the gage of battle in its support. Terrible, indeed, and melancholy are the evils which war inflicts upon nations; but far more terrible the evils of that system of rule which the war was undertaken to end.

The facts adduced in the preceding pages must satisfy any one that Austria had for years determined to seize the first opportunity of striking down Sardinian freedom, and that the position assumed by the English ministers made her believe that this opportunity was come. To the temporising conduct of those ministers we may attribute with justice the evils inflicted upon nations by the two months of that war which Austria, in defence of her grim tyranny, provoked. If Austria had believed in the earnest and cordial co-operation of France and England, her troops would never have crossed the Ticino.

But let no one believe that the evils of that war, terrible as they are or may be, would be well or wisely averted by a tame submission to the continuation of Austrian rule. There are evils which are by

far a deeper curse to mankind than even the most hideous calamities of war. The miseries of a great battle vividly impress our imagination because they are concentrated into a small compass both of time and space.

The victims of despotism fall separate and apart. If we estimate even the loss of human life which since the treaty with Naples, in 1815, has directly followed the system by which Austria has maintained her rule, the muster rolls of those who have been slain in the recent conflicts become trifling in comparison with the sanguinary records of those murdered by that Power which calls itself order. The number of those who perished on the scaffold, or yielded up their lives in dungeons, would in themselves equal the aggregate of loss in the battle field. But when we endeavour to count the number who have fallen in those ruthless massacres by which from that of Naples to Perugia the revolt of the oppressed in Italy has been punished—when we attempt to reckon up those who fell in those multitudinous butcheries of power which have so often made shambles of Italian towns, in the scenes of Naples, in 1848—of Modena, in 1831—of Catania and Palermo in 1849, we start

at finding that the most costly sacrifice of human life upon the battle field falls even in numbers far short of that which despotic powers has strictly caused.

But if we had scales in which we could accurately weigh the miseries inflicted on humanity by the slow, the continuous torture of oppression, against that of even the most deadly war,—if we had means of reckoning the groans of suffering and the cries of agony that have burst from human hearts—if we could count the victims whose lives have been made miserable by every day pressure of tyranny—if we could estimate the slow and agonising waste of human energy and crushing of human hopes, which in Naples, in Sicily, and in Lombardy, had attended the constantly menacing terrors of prescription and martial law—if, in a word, we could track the steps of Austrian tyranny, not merely in its scaffolds, its dungeons, or its military massacres, but follow it in its quiet and orderly tranquillity to the homes it has made desolate, and the families whose happiness it has crushed, the most sensitive philanthropist would shrink with horror from the comparison, and stand back dismayed at these scenes of human suffering,

which would far outweigh all that is caused by ten such conflicts as even those which left their fearful carnage on the fields of Magenta and Solferino.

It is easy to dilate upon the horrors of a great battle,—the scenes of suffering which appal the stoutest heart and shock the sternest nerves. Of what contests in which man ever yet engaged, cannot these things be said? To war, in defence of man's dearest rights—in the holiest and the noblest cause in which freeman ever drew his sword, these evils inevitably belong; and, it is after all, no enthusiastic admiration of the blessings of freedom, no exaggerated sensitiveness to those which have been described the “sentimental grievances” of slavery, but a calm and sober estimate of the balance of human misery, which must pronounce the judgment. Well—immeasurably well—would it have been for the cause of suffering humanity, if one year like the present, with all the horrors and the glories of its sanguinary campaign, could avert from Italy even ten years of the bloodshed and misery with which from 1815 to the present hour, Austrian oppression has desolated her cities and her plains.

## CHAPTER VIII.

Events of 1859—Invasion of Piedmont—Treacherous Designs of Austria—Menace to Piedmont in 1850—Envoy sent from Vienna to intimidate the King—Demand for Suppression of Free Press in 1851—Breaking off of Diplomatic Intercourse in 1853—Appeal of Sardinia to Congress of Paris in 1856, supported by France and England—State of things in January, 1859—Despatch of Sir J. Hudson—Treacherous Plot for the Destruction of Piedmont—Revelations by Lord Normanby—Invasion of Piedmont by Austria cancels Treaties—No Settlement of Italy can now be made that does not expel Austria.

WE now approach the period at which Austria, by her invasion of the Sardinian territory, struck the blow, the opportunity for which she had been watching for ten years.

She did so at the very time when the well-meant efforts of England and Russia gave hopes, however feeble, that a European Congress might possibly obtain a settlement of the Italian question without exposing Europe to the calamities of war.

She did so in the treacherous hope that by a sudden and unexpected invasion she might seize on Sardinia unprepared; that before any ally could come to her assistance, the brave armies of Piedmont might be

annihilated by superior force; and that Austrian armies in possession of Turin might dictate their own terms of peace.

With this treacherous purpose it was that at the very moment when she was amusing France with professions of readiness to negotiate, she had secretly determined—with a notice that was a mockery—to march upon Piedmont the armies with which for years she had laid her plans to enclose her.

Previous to the statement of the act of invasion itself, it is necessary to complete some omitted portions of the history of her dealings with Piedmont after Piedmont became free.

In 1850, when the *coup-d'état* of Louis Napoleon gave hopes that France would use no influence against the cause of despotism in Europe—when it was supposed that the new Emperor would not be unwilling to purchase his admission into the family of despots by giving his adhesion to their views, Austria seized the opportunity of menacing Sardinia for her perseverance in free institutions.

Immediately after the *coup d'état*, a special envoy from Vienna privately visited the King at Turin. He came with the sanction of the Emperor of Austria, the

King of Naples, and the Duke of Tuscany, to present a remonstrance in their name. He pressed upon him the absolute necessity of conforming his Government to the other Italian States; he renewed the representations of the mischief occasioned to neighbouring States by Sardinia's free institutions and free press, and, as an act of friendship from the sovereigns he represented, he warned Victor Emanuel that his perseverance in his course must bring upon him all the evils which must follow the hostility of those powers.

The reply of the King was dignified and firm. He stated his fixed determination to adhere to the course he was pursuing, and claimed the right to manage his own internal affairs as he thought fit.

The very next year Austria openly demanded from Sardinia the suppression of her free press.

In 1853, the Court of Vienna broke off her diplomatic relations with Turin, because Sardinia had remonstrated against an act of violence committed in unjust and illegal confiscation of the property of her subjects.\*

\* By the laws of the Austrian empire any subject can, by going through the proper formalities, denaturalise himself.

From the moment that he does so he becomes, to all intents and purposes, a foreigner; he has no rights as an Austrian subject, and if



All this time Austria was slowly gathering round Sardinia the fortresses from which, at any time, she might pour her armies on her plains. We have seen that by her secret treaties she had converted all the States bordering on the Sardinian frontier into a portion for strategical purposes of her own domains.

In 1856, Sardinia attempted to bring these matters before the European powers—sembled at the Congress of Paris; she was energetically supported by both France and England. In a moderate but firm note she pointed out the danger to which she herself was exposed from the menacing attitude of Austria—the constant peril that threatened the tranquillity of the whole Peninsula from the system of Austrian

he wishes to re-enter the dominions of the empire, he must obtain a passport as a foreigner from the State of which he has become the subject.

Several of the Lombard subjects of Austria availed themselves of this state of the law, and renouncing, with the proper formalities, their privileges as Austrian subjects, they settled in Piedmont, of which country they became naturalised subjects.

This was done with the full consent of the Austrian Government.

In 1853 the property of some of these persons, who had become subjects to Sardinia, was seized by the Austrian Government, without trial or conviction of the owners, and confiscated.

Lord Clarendon declares that this confiscation was wholly illegal and unwarranted. Upon the demand for redress the Austrian ambassador was withdrawn from Turin.

government—and she asked the representatives of assembled Europe to consider the best means of giving peace and security to the Peninsula.

This note was addressed to the Ministers of France and England, after the Sardinian Delegate had failed in inducing the Congress to consider these subjects. Its representations received the warm support of those powers. The Austrian Delegate still insisted that the subject of Italy could not be entertained by the Congress, and it accordingly separated without any effort to adjust the state of things of which Sardinia complained.

From the breaking up of the Conference matters thus proceeded until the commencement of the present year.

On the 3rd of January last, the British Minister at Turin informed Lord Malmesbury that, the whole of Northern Italy was ripe for insurrection; that “the decrees of the Austrian government, particularly those relating to the conscription and the circulating medium, had been so badly conceived and clumsily executed, as to have increased the irritation of the people against their rulers.”

He further stated his belief "that the Sardinian government need not be charged with having increased that excitement and irritation."

And he added the expression of that great truth in Italian affairs, that "the mere existence of a government as free as that of Sardinia is excitement enough to people in the condition of the Lombardo-Venetians, and the Pope's subjects."

Sardinia had abundant evidence that Austria knew this truth, and that she was determined, at all hazards, to carry out the policy of Metternich, and not tolerate representative institutions in any state near the provinces she oppressed.

In such a state of things, and in the presence of such an enemy, it was impossible for Sardinia not to be prepared. In the face of Europe she had remonstrated against that system of Italian government, which had converted the whole of Italy into a slumbering volcano, ready at any time to break out. She had protested against those acts by which Austria, in direct violation of the treaty of Vienna, had assumed the armed control of all Italian States. In the Congress of Paris she had prayed the assembled representatives of the European powers to adjust the

relations of Italian States upon some basis that would give security of tranquillity. In the representation that she made to them, she averred that she was compelled to embody an army that might be ready to offer some resistance to that attack of her powerful neighbour which she had too much reason to expect. She complained of this necessity as a burden upon her restricted finances. From the time of these representations nothing had been changed. The military tactics by which Austria was virtually investing Piedmont had been steadily carried on. The fortifications of Piacenza and the lodgment of Austrian troops on the heights of the Appenines completed the chain of that investment—Austrian armies were increased in Lombardy—nothing was done to alleviate the discontent of the Lombard provinces. On the contrary, the very system was pursued which, in the corresponding period of 1847, Lord Normanby had very plainly intimated was adopted for the express purpose of driving her subjects into revolt.

While matters were in this state—in the beginning of this year, vast numbers of troops were poured with marvellous rapidity into Lombardy. Europe rang with praises of the admirable arrangements of the

Austrian War Office. In a space of time almost incredible an overwhelming Austrian army was in a position to march within a few days upon Turin.

The policy of Austria was clear. Upon the first symptom of insurrection in her Lombardo-Venetian provinces, she would have fastened the quarrel upon Sardinia, by those complaints of her free press, or even her free institutions, which she would not then have made for the first time. In a few days she would have flung her armies upon Turin, and crushed Sardinia, as maintaining institutions incompatible with the tranquillity of the Peninsula. Had Sardinia tamely waited for this assault, Europe might have mourned, but would scarcely have pitied her fall.\*

\* This strange confession of Austrian guilt is made on authority that cannot be questioned. The Marquis of Normandy has undertaken the defence of Austria, and the impeachment of France and Sardinia in the British Parliament. In his personal spite against Louis Napoleon, the noble Marquis has forgotten alike his own despatches as to Austria's conduct in 1847, and the slights put upon him by the Tuscan Court, of which he is now the devoted friend. But his Lordship cannot be mistaken in what he tells us. He has just published, in the form of a pamphlet, his speech delivered in defence of Austria, and the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena, in the House of Lords. The noble Marquis claims, no one can doubt truly, to be in the confidence of these powers, and he bitterly complains that by *an unpardonable violation of confidence* the intention of Austria to invade Sardinia was communicated to Paris in time to enable the French emperor to prepare to aid in the

That Austria really meditated this, her subsequent conduct abundantly proves. The attempts at mediation on the part of England delayed, but did not prevent the attempt. On the 23rd, a summons was addressed by Austria to disarm within three days. To save the necessity of any delay by a reference back to Vienna, the Austrian general was empowered at once to act, and a few days afterwards the invading army crossed the Ticino.

Up to this time Sardinia had done nothing to

defence. In an appendix added to that which purports to be a report of the speech, Lord Normanby states :—

“On the 19th Count Buol unfortunately communicated in confidence his intention to send a summons on the 23rd, the rejection of which would be considered a *casus belli*. This confidence made to the representative of a State which did not deserve it, was betrayed, and its substance telegraphed to Paris, and the first thing known of the intentions of the Austrians was the move of the French troops towards the frontier.”

Lord Normanby does not favour the European public with the name of the power or the representative through whose horrible betrayal of confidence the brave and magnanimous design of pouncing on Sardinia was defeated. The revelation of Vienna secrets is limited to the exposure of the Austrian plan. Fortunately, for the interest of humanity, the Austrian genius is more sagacious in devising surprises than it is prompt in their execution.

Yet in the very same pamphlet it is made a charge against the Sardinian government, that it was armed—against that of Napoleon, that he was prepared.

The English people have a right to know whether the ministers of England were privy to this disgraceful secret, and if so whether they

justify this aggression; she had violated no international law; she had not refused any demand addressed to her by Austria. Austria had no right to insist on her disarming, especially when she had refused to England to disarm herself; its summons to Sardinia to disband her army in three days, with the threat of invasion at the expiration of that period, was an act of aggression as violent as the invasion itself.

Within three days it was impossible for Sardinia to

merit the higher honour of having kept it. If we are to judge of the feelings of Austria by the reasonings of her noble advocate, we may perhaps regard ourselves as indebted to this singular pamphlet for some strange revelations. The noble Marquis undertakes to prove a series of aggressions on the part of Sardinia.

His first and gravest impeachment is actually that she joined England in the Crimean war. "The question," says Lord Normanby, "was naturally asked what could be her object?" No doubt it was—in those Austrian courts of which his lordship reveals the scandals and the spite.

His next and only remaining one is that Sardinia refused to surrender to that mild and beneficent sovereign, the Duke of Modena, some persons whom he claimed as murderers. It turned out that the homicide was committed in the insurrectionary movement, and the extradition treaty expressly excluded political offences.

Such instances as these no doubt are the Sardinian "aggressions" which, in the eyes of the petty tyrants of Italy, justify the Austrian war of extermination—even that treacherous surprise, revealed to us by Lord Normanby, of which the confidence was so unhandsomely betrayed.

obtain that aid upon which alone she could rely for effectual resistance. The object of fixing so short a period was plain.

Does anyone seriously believe that the demand for a Sardinian disarmament was at any time more than a pretext. The pretence that Austria, with her immense army guarding the banks of the Ticino, really thought it necessary for her safety from invasion to disarm the small army of Sardinia, is absurd.

We now know, by the declaration of Lord Normanby, that Austria intended that her intention of sending this peremptory summons should be kept a profound secret until it was actually delivered; that Sardinia, left alone, and with no help available in that time, might fall an easy prey to the overwhelming force that had been gathered for her destruction.\*

The revelation of Lord Normanby will be heard with surprise and indignation throughout Europe. Why was the intention to be kept secret? Where is the violation of confidence in disclosing it, unless the secret was the secret of the assassin, and the confidence that of the accomplice?

The plan, it must be confessed, was well laid.

\* The interviews of Count Buol with Lord Adam Loftus, as related in the despatches of the latter, entirely corroborated this charge.



Overwhelming forces were concentrated close to the Ticino ; Piedmont had no power upon which any one calculated for effectual resistance. The speculations of the best informed English journals were, that Turin must be seized, and Sardinia extinguished before France could come to her aid. The stroke was a bold and a criminal one ; but it was one upon which Austria must venture. Her Italian empire was at stake. She must crush Piedmont by brute force, or Piedmont by the moral force of free institutions would destroy her Italian dynasty. Had the first success been with Austria, she might fairly have calculated on settling Italian affairs in her own way.

Metternich was still alive—he remembered possibly his plan of a similar surprise upon Naples, in 1820, and thought now, as he did then, that “Europe would have applauded success—success is always applauded.”\*

If Metternich prompted these movements he had sagacity enough to calculate that if he succeeded in crushing Sardinia by a surprise, no European nation would trouble themselves with an effort to retrieve her lost freedom and nationality. The extinction of

\* See page 54.

Sardinia, like that of Poland, would have been accepted as a fact, which none but enthusiasts and revolutionists would dream of disturbing.

The best arranged plans of criminal daring are often disconcerted by trifling accidents. By an imprudent disclosure of Count Buol, it would seem that the intention of this *coup-de-main* was discovered. The Emperor of the French had just notice enough to enable him to hurry his troops to the vicinity of his ally, and meet the treacherous invasions of her Austrian foe.\*

With shame and grief it must be confessed that the conduct of the great Protestant powers was not such as to create any distrust in the correctness of these criminal calculations. The despatches of Lord Malmesbury were not of a character to imply that England would take much trouble to avenge the assassination of her ally of the Crimean war. A dignified rebuke would, no doubt, in due time have

\*In one sense the Emperor of the French was not unprepared to defend Sardinia. He had pledged himself to do so if she was attacked.

But for the immediate violence of Austria he was unprepared. It is a fact that when the French troops left Paris, *they were badly provided both with arms and ammunition.*

been printed among her Foreign Office despatches in a blue book ; but this would have been all. Against the interposition of France the Emperor of Austria has confessed, in his proclamation to Europe, that he relied upon the aid of his German allies.

Happily for the cause of freedom the French Emperor took juster views of his obligations to Piedmont, and by his interposition, in spite of the neutrality of England, Europe has been saved from witnessing a crime more atrocious than even the partition of Poland, or the extinction of the free town of Cracow by the sovereigns who had solemnly guaranteed the existence of its rights.

That, however, which is of importance to the European public is, that the war was Austria's own act. By the invasion of Sardinia, she cancelled all those treaty obligations upon which, whether rightly or wrongly, she relied for her right to oppress the fairest provinces of Italy and Europe. She staked her Italian empire upon the fortune of war, and every European State is free to consider the future settlement of Italy without reference to the dispositions of territory that were made half a century ago by Metternich and Castlereagh.

## CHAPTER IX.

Peace of Villa Franca—Reasons assigned by the two Emperors—Influence of Germany—Germanic Confederation—Danger to Germany from a General War—Despatch of Lord Malmesbury to Sir A. Malet—Probable Conduct of England—Lord Malmesbury's Despatch to Sir J. Hudson of 20th May—Misrepresentations contained in it of the Nature of the War—Of the Feelings of the German People—Austrian Rule in Italy an Evil to Germany—It makes Austria despotic at Home—Her Italian Provinces the Source of Weakness not of Strength.

The proclamations of the two Emperors of France and Austria state openly the motives which influenced them to the strange compromise of Villa-Franca.

The Emperor of Austria tells us that he acceded to it because he went into the war to uphold the faith of treaties, relying on "his natural allies," but found herself without allies and unsupported.

The Emperor of France, because if he had persevered, the war must have assumed dimensions not justified by the interest that France had in its issue.

These statements must refer to the Germanic powers, and we may therefore assume that Austria

has surrendered Lombardy, because Germany would not interfere to support her dominion in that province. She retains Venetia because France apprehended that Germany would have defended her if assailed in her Venetian possessions.

Germany, therefore, was in this instance the preponderating power in the scale of Europe. Her influence virtually determined the conditions of peace.

It will be seen that, in a despatch to be quoted presently, Lord Malmesbury had indirectly advised the German powers that great danger to Germany would attend the cession of the fortresses which guard the Tyrol on its Italian side, and had further given them very intelligible hints that he himself entertained serious apprehensions of the character of the objects aimed at by France.

This despatch reveals the true nature of the position assumed by Lord Derby's ministry to the German courts.

Whatever may be thought of the motives which influenced Napoleon in arresting his victorious progress, and abandoning so large a portion of that which he had expressed his determination to obtain—one thing is certain, that no greater calamity could have

befallen Europe, or the cause of its civilisation, than an attempt, on the part of any German power, to interfere in the recent war.

The interest of the German powers in the conflict is rather curious. The treaty of Vienna, instead of the old German Empire with its elective head, established a Confederation of German States for mutual defence. They were combined in an engagement for their mutual defence. The obligation, however, to protect the territory of the Confederated States extends only to that which formed part of the ancient Empire of Germany.

In right of this mutual agreement "to defend not only the whole of Germany but each individual State of the Union, in case it should be attacked," and the mutual guarantee of the Confederated States to each other of such of their possessions as are comprised in the Union, Austria, it was rashly presumed, might claim the aid of the German Diet in case war were carried into any part of her possessions, which, forming a portion of the ancient German Empire, came under the terms of the engagement by which the Germanic Confederation is constituted.

No one, of course, pretends that the Italian

provinces of Austria are under this protection. The districts round Trieste, and the Tyrol are, however, parts of the soil of the Germanic Confederation, and it was said that if either of these were attacked in the course of the Italian war, Austria would have a right to invoke the stipulated aid of the Confederated States.

France and Sardinia so far respected the assumed rights of the Confederation as to abstain from any blockade of the port of Trieste.

It must be admitted that the situation is anomalous. The claim is a strange one that Austria should be at liberty to make war as a separate and independent State, and that yet a portion of her territories should be protected by their incorporation with Germany from the consequences of that act.

If such a right of protection really exists, it is one which will be questioned in the first war in which the interests of all German powers do not exactly coincide. The true obligations of the Germanic Diet do not extend to offering a place of strategic refuge for the military operations of each of its States which might go to war in relation to territories which the

Germanic Confederation is under no obligation to protect.

The vicinity of the Tyrol to the scene of war would have exactly raised the question. Within a short distance of Vienna is situated a portion of the territory of the Germanic Confederation. The armies defending Vienna would almost of necessity have occupied this soil. But it was alleged that it constituted a species of sanctuary, into which they could retreat with impunity; and that the moment the French troops approached the magic circle, the Germanic Confederation was bound to come to its defence.

Such a construction of the terms of that Confederation is equally opposed to common sense and to the rights of independent powers. When Austria proclaims war, all Austrian territory is open to the attacks of war, and it is absurd to say that a portion of it is protected by its chance incorporation with the Germanic Confederation—still more absurd when that territory is used for strategic purposes in a manner which would destroy the neutrality of the soil even of a third nation. Wherever the armies of one nation are actively engaged in the operations of



war, there surely it is the right and the privilege of her enemy to follow them. The public law of Europe cannot tolerate the law of sanctuary for an armed host—to retire to the asylum when defeated, and issue from it again to assail its enemy after the protection of its secure retreat.

This, however, is the claim in deference to which the allies refrained from extending the blockade of the Adriatic to Trieste, and in deference to which the attack upon the Quadrilateral was ultimately abandoned.

Those who now complain of the inadequate result of the war, and who reproach the Emperor Napoleon with having abandoned the liberation of Italy—these were the very persons who encouraged and supported the Germanic Confederation in their claim to protect German territory, even of a nation which was at war.

There is little reason to doubt that the apprehensions of German interference was among the strongest of the motives that induced the French Emperor to stay his victorious arms. With an English ministry professing to be neutral, but in reality hostile, he could not calculate the day upon which either the

German Diet or some single German Power might have sent an army to protect what was called the integrity of German territory. If this was the motive to which he yielded, his conduct indicates a far-seeing acquaintance with the state and the prospects of European affairs.

In whatever form the intervention of Germany occurred, it would have brought with it calamities, the general nature of which it is easy to foresee, the full extent of them impossible to predict.

It would have given Russia the excuse for interfering in the affairs of Central Europe, an interference that must have been attended with results that Germany might long lament.

It would have provoked movements in Germany itself which it would be more desirable for many of the German princes to avoid; it was not their interest to recall the feelings and revive the passions of 1848.

The Foreign Office of England was unhappily then controlled by influences more favourable to Austrian interests than to the cause of popular right. The feeling of the English ministry may be understood from the language used very recently by Lord Derby, when he denounced the war as an iniquitous one;

speaking, as by some strange perversion both he and his party always do, as if that war was the act of Sardinia and France. With such feelings existing in the ministers, the nature of English neutrality may be very well understood—it was perfectly understood in every German court. Lord Derby's ministry had made up their mind that Austria ought never to be disturbed in her Italian possessions, and that Sardinia and France were the aggressors in the conflict. All their communications show this—their speeches in Parliament confess it, and the long despatches which were issued to every court in Europe, except so far as they expressed this, contained little more than the sentiment of "peace at any price."

The policy of Lord Malmesbury was, in feeling, Austrian. It was at the same time, weak and vacillating in the highest degree. It was just the policy calculated to leave England without influence or respect. In missives, not very creditable either to the literature or the manliness of the Foreign Office, advice was tendered officiously to every court in Europe, while, at the same time, it was positively stated that England would not join in any united action to carry out the principle of her own counsel.

The advice which was thus given was of necessity tendered without authority, and received without respect. The real amount of all the verbiage of these despatches was simply to convey to Europe that the cordial alliance between England and France was at an end, and that England had abandoned Sardinia and the cause of Italian freedom.

There was a wide difference in the effect of such a neutrality as this, from that which would have been produced by one in which the feeling of England would have been shown in favour of Sardinia and France, and in which an English minister would have acknowledged the truth—that a long continued series of Austrian aggressions had provoked the war.

In the beginning of May, Lord Malmesbury, in a despatch to Sir A. Malet, warned the Germanic Diet that if they adopted the resolution of declaring war against France, they must expect no aid from England. Why, an English Minister, three years after the Crimean war, should have thought it necessary to say that England was not ready to fight for Austria against Sardinia and France, is one of those mysteries of diplomacy, which, to the uninitiated, will probably never be explained.

But those who can better, because more freely, forecast, the strength and expression of public opinion in England might have warned the little junta of petty tyrants that calls itself the German Diet, that in the event of such a declaration of war, the only possible contingency was, that they might have the English fleet against them. If, indeed, the French Emperor were weak enough to verify the predictions of his enemies, and make a war of aggression upon Germany, then they would have had the sympathies of England, as would every nation fighting for the independence of "Fatherland." But if the Diet were to draw the sword in the cause of Austria—if they were to proclaim a league of Germany to maintain German wrong and maintain German oppression wherever they existed—if the German Confederation led its troops to crush the hopes of free Italy, and trample down the efforts in which Hungary would most assuredly have engaged—the only question of neutrality in England would be, not whether we should protect Germany, but whether we should aid the cause which she assailed. The hatred of Austria among the people of England is as intense as the hatred which Austria bears to England. When the English nation

is roused, the opinion of the country is not guided by the sentiments of courtly or aristocratic circles. The hatred of Austria lies deep in the national heart; she is hated for her despotism, for her bigotry, and for her woman-flogging—she is hated for her oppression of Italy, and if ever the day unhappily comes when German legions shall attempt to crush Italian freedom, a popular feeling will be evoked in England which will compel any English ministry to throw the sword of England into the scale of Italian liberty.

Nothing could prevent this if the French Emperor proves true, as he has hitherto done, and most assuredly will, to the professions in which he disclaimed all wish or intention of obtaining acquisitions for France. Once let the English nation be rid of the distrust which has been artfully excited in his intentions—once let them see that he really desires not the paltry and perilous greatness of territorial aggrandisement, but the true and lasting glory that belongs to him who uses power to give liberty to nations, and the enthusiasm of England in the cause of Italian independence will become the stronger and the more generous in the reaction from the unjust distrust that has hitherto marred it.

No true friend of German interests would brave these perils for the sake of maintaining Austrian tyranny in Italy. In Germany, as in England, a large portion of the population heartily sympathise with the efforts of Italy to be free.

On the 20th of May Lord Malmesbury addressed a despatch to Sir J. Hudson, a little inconsistent with his warnings to the Germanic Diet.

In this despatch he thus stated the views of the late ministers as to the position of Germany:—

“ The excitement which the expectation of hostilities breaking out between Austria and France gave rise to in Germany, has been increased to such an extent by the actual commencement of war between those two Powers, that there is every reason to apprehend some overt manifestation on the part of the Germanic Confederation, of its determination to make common cause with Austria for the defence of her Italian possessions.

“ The Governments of Germany have had no occasion to inflame the passions of the people by appealing to their sympathies in favour of a kindred Power engaged in a deadly struggle with France for the maintenance of the territories secured to it by Treaty, but have, on the contrary, merely gone

“ with the current of popular feeling, which impera-  
“ tively calls for decided action on the part of the  
“ Confederation.

“ Independently of the sympathy with which the  
“ fortunes of the Imperial house are regarded, a deep  
“ conviction is entertained by almost all classes of the  
“ German community, that the safety of the common  
“ country is closely connected with the ability of  
“ Austria to maintain herself against the hostilities of  
“ France. It is felt that success in Italy followed, as  
“ it would be, by the breaking up of those great  
“ fortresses which form a bulwark to all Germany on  
“ the Tyrolese frontier, and of the territorial arrange-  
“ ments of 1815 applicable to that country, will be  
“ but an inducement to France to make a further  
“ attempt to subvert those arrangements on the  
“ Rhine; and that the probability of success in the  
“ latter course will be greatly in favour of France, if  
“ she does not enter upon it until she has paralysed the  
“ power of Austria in her more vulnerable possessions.

“ For this reason, Germany considers that her  
“ future destiny is in a great measure involved in the  
“ result of the Italian war; and that it would be a  
“ suicidal policy on her part to stand aloof, and allow



“ Austria to be subdued single-handed, and thereby  
“ incapacitated in the contingency which all Germany  
“ looks upon as certain to arise, from contributing to  
“ the defence of the common country.

“ The Cabinet of Berlin has alone, of all the German  
“ Governments, resisted, as far as possible, the popular  
“ feeling. It has been wisely anxious not to precipitate  
“ matters, although it has not shown itself  
“ backward in making such preparations as will  
“ enable it, when the time arrives, to play the part in  
“ the defence of German interests which the great  
“ resources of Prussia, and the position that she holds  
“ in the Confederation, qualify her to perform. But  
“ the public feeling in Germany generally, and even  
“ in the Prussian territories, which is daily acquiring  
“ more force, will scarcely permit Prussia much longer  
“ to maintain her expectant policy ; and there is every  
“ reason to anticipate that not many days will elapse  
“ before some decided indication is given by the Confederation  
“ of its determination to look upon the  
“ cause of Austria as vitally bound up with the general  
“ interests of the whole German race.

“ Her Majesty’s Government have done their  
“ utmost, within the bounds of friendly representation,

“ to calm the excitement prevailing in Germany, but  
“ they have not felt themselves called upon or  
“ authorised to dissuade the German States from  
“ taking such measures as those States considered to  
“ be necessary for the maintenance of their several  
“ interests; for they could not assume the respon-  
“ sibility of even morally guaranteeing them against  
“ the eventualities of the Italian war.

“ Her Majesty’s Government have distinctly de-  
“ clared that Germany must not be influenced in  
“ arriving at a decision on the momentous question  
“ now under the consideration of the Diet by any  
“ hope of succour from this country.”

It is difficult to conceive a more complete mis-  
representation, both of the issue involved in the war,  
and of the real feeling of Germany, than this despatch  
contains.

The war is represented as a struggle of France to  
deprive Austria of territories secured to her by treaties,  
and therefore a violation of treaties on the part of  
France.

How utterly false is this representation the slightest  
attention to the patent facts, already adverted to in  
these pages, will enable any one to judge.

England should reflect on the alarming confession that the English Minister had not dissuaded the German Powers from taking part in the war, because England could not even morally guarantee them against the consequences of the war.

It was the duty of the English Minister to use that persuasion, and obtain that guarantee; it was his duty to have asked both from France and Sardinia the positive pledge that they sought nothing beyond such an arrangement of the Italian question as might give peace to Italy; and with this pledge he ought then to have dissuaded any German Power from intermeddling in that question. By doing so he would have placed England in a position of power and authority which would have enabled her to compel, if it were necessary, every one of the Powers to keep their pledges, and effectually to "localise" the war.

England lost this position because her ministers would not give even that half-hearted sanction to the cause of Italian freedom which the adoption of such a course would have implied.

But worse than all is the misrepresentation of German feeling. It is utterly untrue that the people of Germany have the sympathy ascribed to them for

Austrian domination in Italy. Among all that entertain liberal opinions in Germany—and they constitute no small proportion of the intelligence of the nation—the dominion of Austria in Italy is regarded as an evil to Germany.\* It made Austria despotic in her principles. It was the necessity of maintaining her dominion in Italy by a system of suppression, that made suppression the rule of her policy. Austria might have been liberal in Germany, or even in Hungary, were it not for her Italian possessions. All that is retrograde in the civil or ecclesiastical policy of the Court of Vienna may be traced to the same source. Austria enforces absolute principles of government in Vienna, because she must maintain her authority in Italy by acting on them there. If she has surrendered the

\* Perfectly consistent with this feeling, there was industriously created in Germany, as there was in England, the terror of a French invasion. Imaginary designs of conquest were attributed to Napoleon, and the patriotism of Germany, as of England, was invoked to resist them.

In both countries the national good sense is every day triumphing over these alarms, the offspring of cowardice and national prejudice combined. More correct opinions are every day gaining ground of the true character and objects of Louis Napoleon.

These alarms, industriously fostered, may have made for the time the Italian cause unpopular in Germany. But real sympathy, on the part of the people, for Austrian dominion in Italy existed in Germany not much more than in England.

religious liberties of her German subjects to priestly power, it is because in Italy she was compelled, or fancied herself compelled, to rely on the influence of the Church. All this is understood and felt by the advocates of liberal opinion in Germany, and they believe, with truth, that the separation of her Italian provinces would be as much the emancipation of Austria as of Lombardy and Venice.

Neither would the loss of these provinces impair the strength of Austria as a Germanic power. It would add to it. The imaginary loss of the fortresses on the Tyrolese frontiers, which Lord Malmesbury points out as the protection of Germany, would not very seriously impair the security of Vienna, of Brunswick, or Berlin.\* Lombardy was to Austria the source of

\* Lord Malmesbury's despatch to Sir James Hudson is a document, the importance of which must not be overlooked. The opinions attributed to Germany are manifestly adopted as those of the English Cabinet. It is expressly stated that the breaking up "of the great fortresses which form a bulwark to all Germany" "would be but an inducement to France to make a further attempt to subvert the arrangements on the Rhine;" and, finally, that "it would be suicidal policy, on the part of Germany, to stand by and see this done."

Yet, the very writer of this despatch now blames the French Emperor for concluding an inadequate peace, by leaving those fortresses still to protect Germany!!

Could anything be more insulting to the French Emperor than this

weakness, not of strength. In spite of exorbitant and extortionate taxation, the revenue extracted from the country did not supply the expense which the country cost. The recruiting from Italy, even if it supplied soldiers to be depended on, did not give troops equal to the garrison by which the country was held. Even in the financial and military point of view, the enslavement of Lombardy exhausted instead of adding to the resources of the empire; and Austria verified in that province the great political and economic truth that a country that can only be re-

despatch, written after his most solemn and repeated disclaimers of any hostile intentions to Germany.

That despatch branded, in fact, the conduct of the French Emperor as an attempt to commence a war of European conquest under pretence of protecting Italian freedom. It accords exactly with Lord Derby's statement in the House of Lords, that it was a war "undertaken under false pretences."

The opinion thus industriously spread throughout Europe placed the French Emperor in this position when he came to attack these fortresses: he must be prepared to incur the odium in Europe of really attempting a war of European conquest—*nam, more, the risk of being drawn into one.*

He could only maintain his own character for good faith and moderation by retiring from the contest when he did. An attack upon the fortresses would, before long, have involved a war upon the Rhine; and Lord Derby would probably have pointed to the result as a triumphant vindication of his own statement.

But let it be remembered that his position in this respect resulted from the part taken by England towards the German powers. Lord Malmesbury has preserved to Venice the blessings of Austrian rule.

tained by military occupation, can never be worth the cost at which it is kept.

In a moral point of view it weakened her still more. It made her name hated wherever there is sympathy with freedom. It brought upon her the obloquy and the guilt not only of the oppression of her own provinces, but of the still worse oppression which has been practised by the petty tyrants whom she has been obliged to support. To keep her own provinces in slavery, Austria has become the gaoler of Italy; she has even condescended to discharge the office of executioner for her deputy-tyrants. The Duke of Modena literally sent his political prisoners to be confined in the dungeons of the Mantuan fortress, and Austrian soldiers have unhappily too often wreaked the vengeance of Italian princes upon their revolted people.

Thus it is that the continuance of her rule in Italy was to Austria, in truth, a source of weakness and degradation. It was the obstacle to every reform in her system of government at home; it was a constant drain upon her finances; a constant demand upon her military strength—it was so even in peace. In any time of war the discontent of her Italian

population was a diversion in favour of her enemy. Above all it expose her to the just reproof and the deserved hatred of the civilised world.

These things are perfectly understood by every enlightened German, and so far from popular opinion sympathising with the house of Hapsburgh in its struggle to maintain her Italian possessions, every liberal-minded German wishes from his heart that Austria were rid of the incubus, and Germany of the disgrace.

Had the minister of England represented to the German powers the feelings of the English nation on the subject of Austrian misrule in Italy,—had he openly and manfully stated the sympathies of England with the Sardinian cause, Venice would not now be left to Austrian dominion, nor would the fortresses be left in the hands of Austria to frown terror on Sardinian and Lombard freedom.



## CHAPTER X.

### LOUIS NAPOLEON.

[It is necessary to state that, with the trifling alteration of one or two lines, this Chapter has been left exactly as it was written before anyone could have dreamed of the proposals of Villa Franca. Upon one point its predictions have been already verified. The confident assertions of his enemies which imputed to Napoleon designs of family aggrandisement, have been completely refuted. No one can deny that the terms of the peace of Villa Franca are free from any trait of selfish aggrandisement on the part of the French Emperor.]

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Misrepresentations of the Character of Napoleon III.—*Coup d'état*—Judgment of French Nation, of English Nation—Napoleon true to the English Alliance—Bonds of Union between France and England—The Emperor's own Position—His Personal History—His Writings—Mistakes of the First Empire—Fall of the First Napoleon—Mission of the French Revolution—Powers of England—Our cordial Alliance with France essential to Peace of Europe.

THE great effort of the partisans of Austria has been to sow distrust between England and France by exciting in the former country the falsest notions of the character and conduct of the Emperor Louis Napoleon.

He has been represented as entertaining a deadly

enmity to England, as watching only for an opportunity of the invasion which he is said to have planned. It is asserted that he has entered on this Italian war only for the purposes of unjust conquest; and in Germany, as in England, his object is said to be the invasion of their soil.

Every feeling of the English nation has been dexterously and unscrupulously appealed to. Traditional enmity with France—at once the weakest and most criminal of our national passions—has been evoked as patriotism. The tendency to alarm, which in a large class of society is an instinct, has been worked up by stories of invasion; the military ardour of the people has been touched by the proposal to enroll them in the volunteer corps, which ought long since to have been formed, but the mockery of which is now used only to keep up national alarm, by making them a menace or a defiance to France; and lastly, the very sympathy of the nation with freedom was played upon to make us allies of Austria, because it is said Louis Napoleon is a despot at home.

Upon the continuance of a frank and cordial union between France and England even now depends

the preservation of the remnants of European liberty and independence.

It is now too late to vindicate in argument the motives by which the French Emperor was led into the Italian war. The time is rapidly approaching when his own proposals will prove how much these suspicions misunderstood his character. His proclamations to the Lombards have been volunteered under circumstances which forbid any rational man to doubt their sincerity ; and it is possible, nay probable, that before these pages meet the eye of the reader, the triumphant vindication of Napoleon's Italian policy will be found in the equity and moderation of the proposals he will make.\*

That these proposals will embrace either territorial aggrandisements for France, or dynastic advancement for the family of her sovereign, is the prophecy of the enemies of Napoleon, who are also the enemies of Italy, of freedom, and of England.

In December, 1851, that which has been termed the *coup d'etat*, resulted in an appeal to the sense of the

\* It will be remembered that these sentences were written before the meeting of the Emperors at Villa Franca. They have been left unaltered as they originally stood.

people, which by unexampled unanimity in the nation proclaimed Napoleon dictator and then Emperor of France. Upon his conduct the judgment of the French nation was unequivocally pronounced, and no one denies that he holds his power strictly by the free choice of the individual members of the nation over whom he rules. No event of modern history has been so misrepresented as that bold step by which Napoleon saved France from anarchy. The great acts by which master-minds determine the destinies of nations, are and ever will be open to cavil. But the fact is enough, that by an overwhelming majority of all her people, France approved and ratified the act. Yet, after the lapse of eight years, that act is referred to with every exaggeration and misrepresentation which malice can suggest, for the purpose of proving that Napoleon must now be plotting against the peace and independence of Europe.

It is not too much to say that those who are thus driven to that act for the grounds of this accusation, confess that in the intervening seven years they can find nothing to give colour to the charge.

They forget, however, these seven years. They forget that, in 1853, the great mercantile community

of London voluntarily came forward to offer to the Emperor an address, disclaiming, in the name of the British nation, the attacks that had been made upon him. Most assuredly the British nation ratified that disclaimer. The sovereign on the throne went out of her way to confer upon him honors and proofs of her regard. The established etiquette of courts was broken that the Queen might do honor to his representative in this country. Interchange of visits established a relation of almost personal friendship between the monarchs. The enthusiasm of the nation seconded the favour of the Queen, and shouts of welcome attended the movement of Napoleon in our streets.

Is all this to be changed?—is distrust to take the place of admiration, merely because he has come forward to protect the weak against the strong, to take the side of freedom against despotic power, and to liberate Italy from the Austrians?

The charge of enmity to England is so entirely opposed to his whole course of conduct as to be absurd. It is not impossible that if evil counsels prevail in England—if we sacrifice both our interest and our duty to Austrian sympathies and German

predilections—it is just possible that we may one day be plunged into war with France. May Providence avert that which to European civilization and freedom would be the worst calamity that could befall us!

But this can be said with truth, that from the hour of his assuming power to the present—through every change and vicissitude, at every risk and under every provocation, the course of Napoleon's policy has been directed, above all other objects, to the maintenance of a cordial alliance with England.

It is not difficult to understand this to be the policy of his position. The highest considerations point to a union between the nations of France and England as the natural one. The first French revolution has separated France—no matter what be her form of government—from the despotic combinations of Europe. The whole history of France, since the Bourbon restoration, has spread among the people principles, and taught them habits of political thought that attract them by unity of sentiment to England. Upon almost all the great questions of world-wide policy the two nations feel in unison. If in either country the remnant of national antipathies still manifests itself occasionally, the unity of thought

and feeling upon great subjects forms a bond of union too powerful not to point to an alliance between the nations as the one that is the most natural and the best.

As the only two great naval and commercial nations of Europe, they have a further tie. The time is gone by when such circumstances made them rivals, and when each country believed that it could not advance its own commerce except at the cost of that of its neighbour. It has now become the common boast of England and of France, that the flag of each nation has carried commerce and civilisation to the far-off ends of the earth. The very spirit of colonisation and commerce imparts a boldness and freedom of thought different from anything that exists in other countries, and thus indirectly tends to increase the identity of sentiment in the two countries in which that spirit prevails. The jealousies, even, that may be engendered in this honorable rivalry do not mar the union which must arise in the case of nations as of individuals from companionship in pursuits. Of two nations in the Commonwealth of Europe it may be said with truth, "*Idem velle, idem sentire de republicâ ea dehinc firma amicitia est.*"

If we turn to the position of the Emperor himself,

a close and intimate alliance with England is almost a necessity. Whatever may be the power which it exercises, a monarchy based upon election by universal suffrage, needs the support of the country in which alone are firmly established the principles of popular right. The elective character of his sovereignty places him of itself in antagonism to that political system which worships the doctrines of divine right and legitimate succession, and holds as the first principle of its belief that nations were only made for kings to govern. From the very beginning of his power it was perfectly known that designs were entertained to replace, when the opportunity offered, the Bourbons on the throne. Against such designs, Napoleon well knew he could not calculate on genuine sympathy any where but in England.

Those who make it their business to depreciate the personal character of Napoleon, will not believe that the shelter which England afforded him in the days of his exile has influenced his mind to friendship for this country. It has at all events made him acquainted with our laws and our institutions, and informed him of our spirit and our strength.

The best answer after all to the charge of enmity to England is, to ask of those who impute it to him,



to point to one single act of his reign or his policy which was influenced by such a motive. Never has man been more true and steady to a cause than Louis Napoleon on the throne has been to that of the English alliance. He has discerned and acted on the truth which his great predecessor saw too late, that if France is to exercise any decisive influence over Europe as the advocate of liberal opinions, it must be in concord with England. That France under his own rule might one day exercise such influence was the faith that he never abandoned in the days of his deepest depression, the faith to which in his exile he has given utterance under circumstances which made those who heard him regard him with that pity which is near akin not to love but to contempt.

In estimating the personal character of Napoleon, they do him the grossest, the most unspeakable injustice who associate it with any trait of meanness, of treachery, or falsehood. From the cradle to the throne of France, his career has been a marvellous one. But unquestionably there is no passage in all that career, that does not refute these imputations. In his Swiss exile with the mother to whom he clung with a filial devotion that never belonged to a base heart—in his attempts at Strasbourg and Boulogne to

wrest the sceptre of France from the hands of Louis Philippe—in his imprisonment at Ham—in his wanderings in America—in his subsequent refuge in England—his detractors cannot point in all these trying vicissitudes to one single act by which he could justly incur the imputation of bad faith, or which could take from the lofty heroism of his character.

In the books in which during this period he has left his sentiments on record, we may trace the working of his mind. Unquestionably he believed his destiny to be to restore the dynasty of the First Napoleon in France. One of the marvels of his career is the constancy with which he clung to that belief. It is a strange fact in his history, that every effort he made himself to accomplish this ended in failures that to the world at large seemed ludicrous. The ultimate accomplishment of his fate was brought about by circumstances utterly unforeseen, in which he took no part, and over which he could exercise no control. It is also true that, retaining in his heart this unshaken faith, he associated with it the conviction that he was to retrieve the defeats by avoiding the mistakes of the First Empire.

But what were those mistakes? Following the melancholy reflections of his uncle, the present Emperor has told us—the first was the neglect of an alliance with England. In this, indeed, the First Napoleon did not admit that he was to blame. He passionately exclaimed at St. Helena that he had made every effort for a friendship with Great Britain. The hostility between England and the First Napoleon may be traced to many causes—to his position as representing a revolution disgraced by crimes that shook the faith in liberal principles of their most illustrious adherents,—in no small degree to his own imperious and haughty temper, never schooled by adversity and intoxicated by his wild military success, and last, not least, to the ascendancy of tory principles in England, and the personal character of George III.

This much at least is certain, that in his review of his own career, in the bitter reflections of St. Helena, Napoleon I. acknowledged the consequences of his quarrel with England.

Consequent, perhaps, upon this, was the great and fatal mistake of the first empire, the attempt to recast the institutions of Europe by military force,

and the wars of aggression and aggrandisement to which it led.

“I was defeated,” said Napoleon, on the rock of St. Helena, “I was defeated,—not by the hosts of the “allied armies, but by the liberal ideas of Europe.” By aggression that must be called unprincipled, by violating the rights of independent nationalities, he had arrayed against him the spirit and resolution of freemen, and not merely the physical force of slaves. He had placed on the side of the old masters and tyrants of Europe the love of freedom—the hatred of oppression—the attachment to public laws—the regard for individual right—all those strong feelings of the human heart which constitute the strength and power of “the liberal cause.” When these were enlisted on the side of absolute authority, the revolutionary throne fell.

It was in the resolve which resulted in long and silent meditation on these remarkable words, that the declaration of Louis Napoleon originated, when, on ascending the throne of his uncle, he proclaimed “the empire is peace.”

The French revolution had its mission to fulfil. That horrible scene of human passion and human

suffering was not inflicted on mankind to produce no result. It broke up the old principles of government which made the mass of the people slaves ; it stirred new passions, and it raised new questions ; it asserted the principles of democratic liberty, and made war upon the hoary despotisms by which priests and kings and nobles, throughout continental Europe, were trampling upon men. In the war of propagandism which followed, these sentiments were flung far and wide wherever French armies came. A new political creed was taught to mankind even more distinct from old traditions than the religious one which the Reformation had proclaimed. That creed had its faults in rejecting too many of those traditions, which the experiences of England might have shown not to be incompatible with true liberty, but it taught the nations of Europe great principles of freedom, the power of which no combination of monarchies can permanently resist.

The revolutionary throne of the First Napoleon fell—the principles of the revolution were everywhere struck down, and Europe, as we have seen, was subjected again to a despotism made more severe by the insurrections which sentiments left by the teachings

of the French invasion had produced. The re-establishment of the Bourbons in Paris was the visible sign and symbol that the revolution was repealed, and the yoke of legitimacy imposed by foreign force upon France and upon Europe.

It was this feeling on the part of the French nation, which was at the root of those perpetual disturbances which made the Bourbon government always insecure. The mission of Louis Napoleon has been unquestionably to restore the throne of the revolution. Europe has accepted this in recognising him as Napoleon the Third. It does not follow that he is therefore to inherit the faults under which that throne fell. He has himself pointed out to us that the chief of these were its estrangement from England, and its wars of aggression and plans of territorial and family aggrandisement.

Clearly and distinctly has Louis Napoleon seen these faults. He has firmness and self reliance under every temptation to avoid them.

But if we could believe, in spite of his recorded opinions, in opposition to every act from which his true convictions can be inferred, that the French Emperor really meditates these schemes which have

been so recklessly attributed to him, this would not, therefore, form the slightest reason for England's desertion of her proper position as the leader of the liberal cause of Europe. On the contrary, it would be the strongest reason for compelling us not to leave to him the sole control of that cause, and the power and the influence which must belong to him who has it. Let England only be true to that cause—let her do nothing to alienate from her the millions of hearts through Europe which are longing for free institutions, and, therefore, irresistibly attracted to England, and we are powerful enough in moral as in physical strength to moderate and control all Europe. Half a century ago the liberal opinion of Europe was strong enough to make the First Napoleon fall before it. How immeasurably in that half century has its power been increased? Let England steadily pursue a course of consistent justice, and we have nothing to fear. We will embark in no crusade of propagandism—we need not even trouble foreign courts with the every-day recurrence of our meddling advice. Let it be thoroughly understood that our policy abroad is in harmony with our free and liberal institutions at home. Let us neither seek occasion to quarrel, nor bind

ourselves by those coward declarations of neutrality, that are of all others the most likely material to pave the road to war. Let Europe know that we are ready to assert our authority in her councils whenever it is fitting that we should do so ; and, above all, let it be felt that English sympathy is everywhere with free institutions, and we will take a place which, were it needed, will give us influence sufficient to prevent any, even the most powerful, of our liberal allies from attempting unjust and ambitious wars.

In the name of our courage and our common sense, let us not be scared from the cause of right by vain and timorous alarms. We have already done all we can for the aggrandisement of Louis Napoleon. England's Queen has long since received him as her equal—we have enrolled him in the time-honoured ranks of our antient chivalry—we have loaded him with honours, and almost oppressed him with adulation—we gave him the place of the champion of European independence in the Crimean war. Having done all this, we are not to exhibit distrust of him in the very enterprise, in which, of all others, we should show him sympathy, and in relation to which, he frankly invited our concurrence of political action.



These misrepresentations of the conduct and character of Louis Napoleon are not circulated without an object. In 1847, we have seen Austria terrifying the Italian princes by attributing similar designs to the Pope. In the year following, her agents every where asserted that our efforts in favour of the Sicilians were dictated by a secret agreement between France and England, by which France was to gain possession of Sicily, while England was to be allotted Egypt for herself! She is now, by her agents both in Germany and England, pursuing exactly the same course, persuading, with just as much truth, the ignorant in Germany that the French Emperor is exhausting his military strength in defending Sardinia in Italy, only that he may facilitate his invasion of the Rhine; and terrifying the women in England with the belief that the battle of Magenta is fought to promote a design of throwing French troops upon London.\*

A very little time, as has been already said, will prove how utterly false the imputations which attributes to him designs of self-aggrandisement in the

\* Who can wonder at his complaint that Europe was unjust to him in the commencement of the war!

Italian war. Never was war more frankly, or more nobly, or more disinterestedly undertaken. Sardinia was his ally. Sardinia was unjustly assailed, and he protected her. Would to God that England, guided by her free parliament, could make as proud a boast of her conduct. His defence of Sardinia was prompted by no selfish motive. Influence, indeed, he desires, and he has told us so, but it is the influence which results from noble acts—from the attachment of nations—from the belief that he is the protector of right in Europe. That influence we have left him, in abandoning to him the defence of Sardinia and the emancipation of Italy. He offered to share it with us, and we refused. He knows full well that this is the only influence which, in this age of opinion, can be permanent. The attempt to gain that of territorial conquest would array against him “the liberal ideas” of Europe, and be his ruin.

In the cordial and unsuspecting agreement of France and England rest not only the hopes of a tranquil settlement of the Italian question, but those of the peaceful progress of European civilisation and freedom. Like the empire, it is peace. Twice has the peace of Europe been broken in the last seven years, and

each time it was when the cordiality of France and England was believed to be disturbed. Nicholas would never have invaded the Danubian principalities if he had believed that France and England would float their flags together in Besika Bay. The temporary estrangement which the manœuvres of faction caused in 1858, provoked the Austrian invasion of Sardinia in 1859. Had France and England not been united, Constantinople would not have been saved. If France and England now cordially act together, Italy, without further bloodshed, will be free.

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In the above observations, no reference has been made to the form of government administered by Louis Napoleon in France.

This does not disentitle Louis Napoleon to the confidence of Englishmen. It did not do so in 1853—it does not do so in 1859. The internal form of government is a consideration for Frenchmen themselves. That which concerns us is the conduct of the chief of the nation in the external relations of his policy.

Every Englishman would earnestly desire to see free institutions established in France. They alone

can make her greatness and her happiness independent of the personal character of her sovereign, and establish her prosperity upon a national basis; but if the free and uncoerced opinion of the French people has declared that the time for a dictatorship is not yet passed, this surely gives us no right to assail either the nation or the sovereign of their choice. A proud and high-spirited people, we may be assured, know best their own danger and their own necessities.

But let this be remembered, that when we speak of the government of France as an absolute monarchy, we speak of a very different thing from the despotism which crushes and enslaves so many nations. The supreme power of Louis Napoleon results from the choice of the people, who have as much right to confer it upon one individual as they have upon a parliament.

In the administration of the French government, we do not find those oppressions and abuses which in other parts of Europe have made absolute monarchy identical with oppression and misrule. The great end of all government is to secure freedom and tranquillity to every home. The empire of Louis Napoleon has done this. Law is impartially administered, and the

laws themselves are equal and just. Religious liberty is observed—personal liberty is respected. No oppressions crush, no exorbitant taxations grind down the people. Whatever be the machinery of the government, the great mass of the people feel the government itself to be free. In her municipal institutions, in her free tribunals, in her enlightened code of laws, in her trial by jury, and in her system of social equality, France, under imperial rule, practically enjoys the great blessings which free government was intended to attain.

It is the resolve of the French nation that the rule of their chosen chief should sway those political movements, which in this country we entrust, in some degree at least, to the decision of our Parliament. It does not follow, of necessity, that arbitrary principles should pervade the internal economy of France—in point of fact, they do not.

No virtue in the administration of absolute power can or ought to reconcile us to its possession by one individual. But still, let us remember that there may be periods in a nation's history in which her destiny or even her will can only be carried out by one strong

mind directing all her resources. It was, indeed, the dream of one of our philosopher-poets\* that in the progress of civilisation we might be able to discover a mode of government in which, under the influence of opinion, one enlightened individual wielding absolute power, might best represent in his acts the will of the community at large.

The government of Louis Napoleon has realised something like this in France. That he really represents the public opinion and the public feeling of the country no one doubts: and while this is so—nay, more, while he owes his power to the free and deliberate choice of the people—while every one knows that were the question put to them to-morrow, they would ratify that power by a majority as great as that by which they conferred it—it is impossible to confound the popular sovereignty of Louis Napoleon with those despotisms which resting on the right divine to govern wrong, act in defiance of every principle of civil and religious liberty, and crush down their people by the iron rule of arbitrary power.

With the most unfeigned devotion to the principles, and attachment to the forms of free government—in

\* J. T. Coleridge.

the deep conviction that by it alone can the happiness of nations be permanently secured, or men trained to that spirit of independence which makes communities great, and prosperous, and free—with the cordial desire that France may yet enjoy that constitutional system, at which so many attempts have failed—with the earnest prayer that the love of Englishmen for free institutions may be as lasting and as universal as their love of justice—it must still be emphatically repeated that, viewing justly the position of France and her sovereign, it were political bigotry to suppose that either the form or the acts of the French government disentitle Louis Napoleon to the confidence and alliance of the English nation.

## CHAPTER XI.

Treaty of Vienna—Treaties cancelled by War—Case of Belgium—Cracow  
—Atrocities of Austria in Galicia—Unfulfilled Obligations of Treaty of  
Vienna—National Institutions in Poland—Religious Liberty and Free  
Press in Germany.

IN the belief that the whole Italian question must still be submitted to the opinion of a European congress—nay, not impossibly to the arbitrament of a renewed war—a few words may be bestowed upon the claim which Austria has put forward to retain her Italian possessions by virtue of the Treaty of Vienna.

No doctrine could be more convenient to the Imperial oppressor than that which asserted that for the retention of the provinces he oppressed he had the guarantee of the public law of Europe.

In nothing, perhaps, were the Austrian sympathies of the late ministry more manifested than in the words which they put into the mouth of their sovereign on opening Parliament in the present year. The Queen was made to say that her foreign policy would, above



all things, be guided by a strict respect for the inviolability of the faith of treaties.

In the abstract no sentiment could be more worthy of a British sovereign. But the sayings even of monarchs must be interpreted by the circumstances under which they are uttered, and these expressions of the Queen in the then circumstances of Italy, implied to Germany and to Europe that England was prepared to guarantee the Italian possessions of Austria as fixed by the Treaty of Vienna.

These sentences in the Queen's speech had much to do with the course which Austria ventured soon after to adopt. It is not to be wondered at if Austria on the one hand, as Italy on the other, complain of the desertion of England, and accuse her of insincere encouragement, of weak support, and of final betrayal of the cause to which she seemed to give her adherence.

A very few words will, under existing circumstances, dispose of the claims of Austria under the Treaty of Vienna. Her voluntary cession of Lombardy deprives her of all title under any treaty right to that province; but supposing differences, which must be foreseen, to interrupt the conclusion of peace upon the terms of the Villa Franca arrangement, it ought

distinctly to be understood that her claim to hold Venetia under that treaty is equally destroyed.

The war which Austria declared against Sardinia was the deliberate cancellation of every treaty between these powers. No principle is better established in international and European law than this. When Austria took the step of invading Piedmont, she did so with the knowledge that by that act she forfeited all treaty right to her Italian possessions, and left her title to be determined by the sword.

It is not necessary, therefore, to refer to that memorable instance in which, for the general interests of European peace, the arrangements of the treaty of Vienna have been made subject to the supervision which the necessity of circumstances imposed. In spite of the protest of Holland, the kingdom of Belgium is constituted of provinces which that treaty assigned to Holland. The King of Holland was compelled by the powers of Europe to acquiesce.

It would be impossible, especially, for Austria to urge the argument drawn from these treaties, even if she herself had not cancelled them by making war. Europe does not forget that in 1846, Austria

marched her troops into a city the independence of which was really guaranteed by the powers that were parties to that treaty ; and on the 14th of November in that year, by an ordinance to which Russia, Prussia, and Austria alone were parties, and against which England and France protested, the free city of Cracow was, by an act of forcible violence, incorporated in the Austrian dominions.\*

\* The article of the Treaty of Vienna—relating to the free city of Cracow—is the 6th. It is in words very different from those in which in other articles of the treaty territories are ceded or annexed. They are these :—

“The town of Cracow, with its territory, is declared to be for ever “a free, independent, and strictly neutral city, under the protection of “Austria, Russia, and Prussia.”

In spite of this provision the three “protecting” powers did not hesitate to seize on Cracow, and annex it to the Austrian dominions.

Every one of the reasons of State necessity by which they professed to justify this act, would apply with unquestioned truth to the separation of Lombardy and Venice from Austria.

Those who wish for further information on this subject may consult the parliamentary debates of 1847. The late Mr. Hume proposed a resolution in the House of Commons on the subject. It was seconded by Lord Sandon, now Lord Harrowby.

In adverting to this subject, it is impossible to omit some notice of the atrocious crime by which the Austrian government prepared the way for this act of seizure.

In her Polish province of Galicia, Austria, in 1845, had disbanded about 8,000 soldiers, whose time of service had expired. She retained them in her pay, as a kind of secret police, and these men were employed to excite a servile war of the peasants against the nobles.

Alarmed at this, the nobles themselves took up arms. History

These instances are unnecessary. No person can pretend that the Treaty of Vienna could be so construed as to authorise a European Power to invade the territory of another, and then appeal to the provisions of that treaty to shelter itself from the consequences of its own aggression. All the arrangements of territory which it laid down were subject to the general law of nations.

But if Europe was called at this moment to review the acts of the powers who were parties to the Treaty of Vienna—there are questions to be raised very different from the mere preservation of the line of Austrian territory in Italy. The spirit, indeed the letter of that treaty, we have seen to be openly violated by Austria in the relations she has established with the Italian States. Even in relation

records nothing like the horrors of the pillage, rapine, and murder, in which the Austrian agents directed the socialist peasantry against the chateaus of the landlords.

The fact of this atrocious employment of these Austrian agents does not rest on hostile testimony. It is one of the admitted facts of history, confessed by the writers who are most friendly to the Austrian cause.

Even in the mitigated account of the historian of toryism, enough is told to justify the statement, that the vilest wretch that ever suffered on an Austrian gibbet might have referred to these atrocities, and appealed to the just judgment of heaven, whether he ought not to change places with the government that condemned him.—(*Alison's Europe*, vol. vii. p. 173.)

## CHAPTER XII.

Peace of Villa Franca—Motives attributed to Louis Napoleon—True motives of his Conduct—"The Empire is Peace"—Policy of his Reign—Primary objects of the War—Hostility of Lord Derby's Ministry to France—Necessity of terminating Austrian Influence in Italy—Details to be settled in accordance with the Basis laid down at Villa Franca—Immense importance of these Details—England's Duty to Support the Italian Cause.

It has already been said, that while these pages were actually passing through the press, marvellous events have materially, although not altogether, altered the aspect of Italian affairs.

Suddenly, and apparently without concert or communication with any others, the Emperors of France and Austria met at the village of Villa Franca. A conference of a few hours sufficed to stay the progress of a war which had assumed colossal proportions ; and those preliminaries of peace were arranged, the outline of which has been given to Europe.

Lombardy, in accordance with the universally expressed wish of her people, receives Victor Emanuel for her king, and is freed from the Austrian yoke. Venice, with the surrounding provinces, still con-

tinues an appanage of the Imperial crown, and Lord Malmesbury's apprehensions as to the safety of Germany are tranquillised by leaving in the hands of Austria the great fortresses, which, in the words of our late Foreign Secretary, "form a bulwark to all Germany on the Tyrolese frontier."

The Austrian archdukes are to be restored to the thrones of Tuscany and Modena.\* A proposal is to be made to unite the Italian States in a confederation under the honorary Presidency of the Pope.

No advantage whatever, either in territory or compensation, is gained or stipulated for to France.

It has been already observed that these outlines must be filled up by details, in the arrangement of which wide differences may exist. Both the existence and the terms of the proposed confederation must depend, first upon the assent of the States that are to form it, secondly upon the sanction of a Congress of the great European powers

The motives which induced this marvellous termination of hostilities have been questioned, and, as

\* It will be seen that this "restoration" means something very different in the Austrian and French version. These princes are not to be forced back upon their people. So far as France is concerned they are restored to their dominions—so far as their subjects are concerned, they are left to settle with them as they can.

usual, men have attributed to the French Emperor designs of future conquest, which he is said to be carrying out by sparing Austria, and thus converting her into an ally to aid himself and the Emperor of Russia in their project of attacking England, or Prussia, or both!! It need scarcely be said, that up to the very time of the peace of Villa Franca, and in spite of the Emperor's solemn proclamations, both to the Germans and Lombardy, it was asserted, with the most unblushing confidence, that he would establish a kingdom for one of his family in Italy; and, with equal confidence, that he would send an army to seize the German provinces on the Rhine.

The peace of Villa Franca is, at all events, the refutation of these calumnies. Its fault is the excessive moderation with which the French Emperor has dealt with the defeated Austrian power.

Those who cannot comprehend the motives which induced the French Emperor, in the moment of apparent victory, to stay his conquering hand, endeavour to find in the designs which they attribute to a personage, whom they invest with more than the mystery of romance, reasons for a conduct which appears inexplicable. They solve that which they call the riddle of the sphinx, by assuming that

Louis Napoleon assented to peace because it forwarded some secret plans of universal conquest.

Those who have read the observations contained in the preceding pages upon the German confederation, and upon the character and objects of the French Emperor, will be able to assign very different and more probable motives for the course which he pursued.

When Louis Napoleon, on his accession, announced to Europe that the empire was peace, he did not mean that France, under Imperial government, would never go to war; but he did mean that the third empire of a Napoleon was to avoid the mistakes of the first, and that his throne in France was not to be maintained by movements that would plunge Europe into a general revolutionary struggle.

The policy of the first Napoleon, forced perhaps upon him by his position as the child and champion of the revolution, was one of war. The empire inherited the propagandism of the republic. The war of opinion soon became one of conquest and aggression. Ancient dynasties were destroyed, and old landmarks disturbed, not to give freedom to oppressed nations, but to find thrones for the relatives of



Napoleon, and to establish French influence by bringing reluctant nations under the yoke.

That policy, if it could be called such, of universal war, of territorial conquest, of family aggrandisement, the present emperor believes it to be his destiny to avoid. His mission is a peaceful one—to assert the influence of Napoleon's throne, without Napoleon's wars.

Had his troops once passed the Mincio, he stood upon the threshold of a departure from the wise and enlightened policy he had thus laid down. Failing (to our shame be it spoken) in securing the co-operation of England, he had, before the war commenced, endeavoured to employ an understanding with Russia for the purpose of keeping the German States neutral in its progress. This was done, not in the belief that it would be necessary for Russia to strike a blow, but that the mere fact of the co-operation of Russia being secured would in itself compel the neutrality of Germany.

In accordance with this understanding, the manifesto of the Russian cabinet was issued. It failed in its effect. It is impossible to know what communications passed between the French Emperor and the

Russian court. It may be that Russia refused to coerce Germany to neutrality. It is far more probable that Louis Napoleon did not desire such an intervention.

From whatever cause it proceeded, it is quite plain that when Napoleon led his victorious army to the walls of Vienna, he had no assurance of the continuance of German neutrality. The moment he attacked the Quadrilateral he must have been prepared for some movement that might have brought him in collision with the whole of Germany. What would have been the result? Exactly that which he has pledged himself to avoid—a general revolutionary war. Hungary in arms to shake off the Austrian yoke! Germany in arms against France. France would have been driven in self-defence to excite and stimulate the insurrectionary spirit in every German State; no one would answer for or control the passions that would have been excited; no one could tell what dynasties must fall, or what new ones be created. France would probably have marched on Prussia's Rhenish provinces. The enemies of the Emperor would have said that all they predicted of his designs was fulfilled. The national feelings of

Europe would have been stirred against him, and, in spite of himself, he would have been forced into that career of conquest and aggression in which the first Napoleon fell, and which he had laid it down as the whole policy of his life and his empire to avoid.\*

These were the considerations which influenced the French Emperor to accede to the compromise of Villa Franca. This yielding to them is but a proof of the firmness with which he adheres to the policy

\* The very day after the above sentences were written by one who had watched from a far off distance the Emperor's career, the Emperor himself was thus stating to the French legislature the reasons which influenced his retirement from the war :—

“ Arrived beneath the walls of Verona, the struggle was inevitably about to change its nature, as well in a military as in a political aspect. Obligated to attack the enemy in front, who was entrenched behind great fortresses and protected on his flanks by the neutrality of the surrounding territory, and about to begin a long and barren war, I found myself in face of Europe in arms, ready either to dispute our successes or to aggravate our reverses.

“ Nevertheless the difficulty of the enterprise would not have shaken my resolution if the means had not been out of proportion to the results to be expected. It was necessary to crush boldly the obstacles opposed by neutral territories, and then to accept a conflict on the Rhine as well as on the Adige. It was necessary to fortify ourselves openly with the concurrence of revolution. It was necessary to go on shedding precious blood, and at last risk that which a sovereign should only stake for the independence of his country.

“ If I have stopped it was neither through weariness nor exhaustion, nor through abandoning the noble cause which I desired to serve, but for the interests of France. I felt great reluctance to put reins upon the ardour of our soldiers, to retrench from my pro-

of peace and moderation, which he believes to be the destiny of his reign, as that of his great predecessor was violent and universal war.

Unquestionably, in surrendering Venice to the continuance of Austrian dominion, he has given up that which every friend of freedom must deplore. The war is terminated before Venice is liberated by force of arms. "Uti possideatis" are the territorial terms of the peace. There are oppressed nationalities,

"gramme the territory from the Mincio to the Adriatic, and to see vanish from honest hearts noble allusions and patriotic hopes. In order to serve the independence of Italy I made war against the mind of Europe, and as soon as the destinies of my country might be endangered, I concluded peace.

"Our efforts and our sacrifices, have they been merely losses? No; we have a right to be proud of this campaign. We have vanquished an army numerous, brave, and well organised. Piedmont has been delivered from invasion, her frontiers have been extended to the Mincio. The idea of Italian nationality has been admitted by those who combatted it most. All the Sovereigns of the Peninsula comprehend the imperious want of salutary reforms.

"Thus, after our having given a new proof of the military power of France, the peace concluded will be prolific of happy results. The future will every day reveal additional cause for the happiness of Italy, the influence of France, and the tranquillity of Europe."

It may well be amongst his proudest boasts, that against the mind of Europe, influenced by an almost insane dread of the ambition imputed to him, he engaged in a war which, at all events, saved Sardinia from destruction.

"The influence of France and the tranquillity of Europe," are the watchwords of the empire of the third Napoleon.

whose freedom is not to be purchased at the expense of a European convulsion, which would probably end like those of the first revolution, in fixing the fetters of slavery more firmly upon nations.

Very different, indeed, would have been the case, if he could have relied upon the cordial co-operation of the power to which every movement of Italian freedom might naturally look for support. If England, France, and Sardinia had been united, they might have dictated their own terms of peace.

Contemplating the compromise of Villa Franca in its bare and naked outlines, it is one that cannot give satisfaction to any friend of Italian freedom—it is one, beyond all question, that does not give satisfaction to the Emperor himself. It secures, nevertheless, the great and primary object for which the war was undertaken.

That object was to protect Sardinia from Austrian invasion. This is done. The Austrian armies are repulsed from the soil of Piedmont, and not only so, but Piedmont is made a great and powerful state by the annexation of the Lombard provinces to her rule.

This is at present the whole of the gain to the cause

of Italian freedom, but it is an important one. We have seen that upon the strength and power of Sardinia depends, in truth, the hope of Italian independence.\*

It is impossible that the other arrangements can be carried out, except with the sanction of the great European powers. In the discussions which must precede that sanction, we may expect further securities for Italian freedom.

It is plain, from the proofs and documents already adduced in these pages, that the great evil of Italy is the influence which Austria, in violation of the Treaty of Vienna, has acquired over Italian States, which that treaty supposed or assumed to be

\* It must not be forgotten that, though the ministry of Lord Derby professed present neutrality, they gave very plain indications that, in their opinion, if the war went on, England would be found in hostility to France. They spoke of England's ultimate interference—their language could leave no doubt upon which side they contemplated it.

Sir John Pakington went further—he stated his opinion to be that, if the war went on, *England could not long keep out of it*. Upon which side did Sir John Pakington expect that England would be?

Every word that fell from the late ministry emphatically warned Louis Napoleon that when he encountered Germany, he must expect the hostility of England. The ministers most conspicuous in the use of these expressions had received extraordinary honours from the court. No expression of opinion, either in Parliament or the country, contradicted them. At the time of the peace of Villa Franca, the French Emperor had no public reason to count even on the neutrality of England if he went on.

independent. Of this it was that Sardinia complained: against this she remonstrated before the other powers of Europe. Austrian interference to suppress liberty in every Italian State, it is abundantly demonstrated, has been from 1815 to this hour the cause that has withered and blighted every Italian hope.

Unless this be put an end to once and for ever, but little is done for Italy at large. This vital subject is not touched upon in the sketch which forms the basis of agreement between the Emperors at Villa Franca. If Austria is really willing, in sincerity and good faith, to renounce the policy of Metternich,—if she is ready to give up that right of interference by which, since 1815, she has kept the Italian sovereigns her slaves,—if she binds herself never to interfere in the internal arrangements of any Italian State,—then, indeed, although the settlement does not establish Italian freedom, it does establish Italian independence, and secures the complete establishment of Italian freedom at no distant day.\*

If, on the other hand, Austria attempts to retain that right of armed intervention in the Italian States,

\* It must not be forgotten that, as Lord John Russell pointed out in the House of Commons, Count Buol a very short time before the

of which the evils have been so clearly shown—then, it is impossible for Italy to be at peace.

It must be remembered that the proposal of an Italian confederation is attended with suspicious antecedents. It was first proposed by Austria herself in 1816, with a view of binding Piedmont to the Austrian system of Italian rule. The proposal was then, as we have seen, resisted both by France and Russia. An Italian confederation, in which Austria had a voice, and of which the Pope would be President, might be only a pretence for establishing another German Diet south of the Alps, and in effect giving Austria the decisive power in two confederations, in Germany and in Italy.

This must depend upon the rules under which the confederation is constituted. This cannot be arranged without a congress of the European powers; the question is one too deeply and vitally affecting not only the peace of Italy, but the general balance of power in Europe.

actual breaking out of hostilities, refused to pledge Austria to give up her right, or rather practice, of armed intervention in the affairs of Italian States.

If she adheres to the same refusal at the Conference of Zurich, can the Conference go on ?



It will be asked is the Austrian Archduke in Tuscany—is the Bourbon and Austrian Duke of Modena to have a voice in this confederation? Is the confederation to be one merely for external defence, or is it to be one in which the confederated sovereigns are to support each other in oppressing their subjects? Is its original constitution like that of the Germanic confederation, to make provision for internal reforms and liberty of conscience in the several States? In what weight or proportion are the several incorporated States to have a voice in the deliberations of the Diet? These are questions yet to be answered. They cannot be settled by any agreement between the belligerent Emperors.

Again, if Venice is to be left in the possession of Austria, is there to be any stipulation as to the mode or form of her future government? Is her army to be German or national?

Is the Pope to grant reforms that will satisfy his subjects such as, in 1832, were pressed upon Gregory XVI. by Austria herself? or is he to be kept upon his throne against the will of his people by French or Austrian bayonets?

Is the restoration of the sovereigns of Tuscany, of

Modena, and of Parma, to be forced upon the people ?  
If so, by whom ?

Is the Government of Naples to be protected by an Italian confederation in pursuing that course of lawless misgovernment which has made the Neapolitan name the bye-word of the civilized world ? Is Sicily to have that free constitution to which she has an ancient right, and to secure her which the good faith of England is virtually pledged ?

These are some of the questions which must be solved before the settlement of Villa Franca can assume the form and shape of an actual and settled reality in European affairs.\*

It is plain that in this solution the general opinion of Europe must, both in congress and out of it, have a potential influence, and once more the opportunity is presented to England of raising her voice with effect for the cause of Italian freedom.

That this may be done, the first and most essential

\* The questions left open by the Conference of Villa Franca, and on which a disagreement may be expected in the Conference of Zurich, are these :

The renunciation of Austrian intervention in the affairs of other States.

The restoration, by force, of the deposed archdukes.

The constitution by which Venice is to be governed.

requisite is a cordial and frank understanding with the Emperor of the French.

The time is assuredly come when England is bound to give him her moral co-operation and support in seeking all of the independence and freedom of Italy that her past vacillations and worse than vacillations, has left it still possible to attain.

The constitution of the Italian diet is a subject which cannot be settled except by an appeal to the great powers of Europe and to the States that are to compose it.

But before this, it involves a question on which it is by no means certain that France, and Sardinia, and Austria will agree.

With these difficulties and many more like them, it were rash to assume the Italian question settled.

## CHAPTER XIII.

Details to be insisted on in Settlement—Piedmont and Lombardy to retain Free Institutions—Deposed Sovereigns not to be restored by Force—Austrian Intervention to cease—Foreign Troops to be withdrawn—Necessity of cordial understanding between England and France—Feeling of Italian People—Venice entitled to Free Institutions—Canning's War of Opinion—Impossible for England to support the Restoration of Austrian rule—Lord John Russell's Statement of Despotism against England—Real Danger of England—Hatred of English Constitution by the Despotism of Courts—Advantages of a Free and Independent Kingdom of Northern Italy—Conclusion.

WHENEVER the French Emperor comes to carry out in detail the terms indicated at Villa Franca, there are points upon which he is bound even by regard to his own dignity to insist. In so insisting on them, it is the plain duty of England to give him her most energetic and cordial support.

Venice, if left under Austrian rule, must have a free constitution and liberal government. It must be garrisoned by Italian not German soldiers—it must be an Italian state, and not a German province.

Sardinia must be left perfectly free, both in

Piedmont and Lombardy, to maintain those liberal institutions, to suppress which Austria began the war, and in which, in spite of the threats of Austria, her gallant king and noble people have persevered.

No attempt must be made to impose by force the return of their deposed sovereigns upon Tuscany, Modena, or Parma.

If possible, pledges of real and substantial reform should be obtained both from Naples and the Papal States; but beyond all, and above all, stipulations should be entered into which will effectually prevent Austrian troops from ever again dictating internal policy either to the sovereign or the people of any Italian State.

All foreign military occupations within the Peninsula should cease. Italy and the Italians must be left to manage their own affairs.

It is of vital importance to the peace of the world that France and England should come to an understanding upon subjects such as these. If the Emperor of the French consents to pursue such a policy as this, he ought to receive the frank and cordial assurances of England's support.

To attempt to restore the Austrian power in Italy,

even under the specious name of a confederation, would be to condemn Italy to universal war. Among the falsehoods industriously circulated by Austrian agents, none was more monstrous than that which represented the Italian nation, as indifferent and lukewarm in the war. All that we know of national enthusiasm is tame and spiritless, compared with that frenzy of excitement into which the entering of the allies into Milan worked up the whole Italian mind. The fervour of the rejoicing surpassed all bounds of self-control. Strong men burst into tears in the agony of their joy—fair women rushed to greet and welcome the wounded soldiers who had bled in the cause of Italy's liberation. Those who witnessed that tumultuous gush of the feelings of the outpoured soul of the nation, will not easily believe that the Italian people were indifferent or cold.

But it was not in the hour of its triumph that the Italian people proved their enthusiasm to their cause, nor was it only in Lombardy that this enthusiasm was felt. The volunteers who flocked from every part of Italy to the Sardinian standard brought the most touching evidences of the national devotion. Noblemen of rank and fortune abandoned their home and

their comforts to serve as private soldiers in the army of liberation. Still more decisive proofs of sincerity and sacrifice were given by the Italians of the middle class, who crowded every steamer that arrived, having flung up, many of them, a comfortable livelihood in foreign countries to risk their lives and their all in carrying the musket that was to do service in the ranks. All classes and conditions of men were directed by one feeling, and animated by one hope.

Even before the glorious successes of the present war, there was no rational hope of peace in that country, while a high-minded and spirited people were ground down by the slavery that existed under Austrian rule. "Semper et ubique." The elements of disturbance were always and everywhere in existence. From 1815 to the present day, the history of Italy has been a record of revolutionary attempts, for a time, more or less successful. Secret societies have enrolled not merely the lower orders, but many of the nobles, the men of letters, and her middle classes, in leagues that have sworn never to rest until Italy is free. The sympathies of freemen, in every country, have invested the cause of Italian patriotism with a sacred glory. Since

the war commenced defeats of their Austrian oppressors have excited the enthusiasm of the nation. The proclamations of the French Emperor and the Sardinian King have excited hopes and stirred up passions that cannot be repressed, and unless the settlement that is to follow the compromise of Villa Franca open at least the prospect of freedom for Central and Southern Italy, so far from giving peace to either Italy or Europe, the disappointed hopes of the population will assuredly find their revenge in an insurrection throughout the entire Peninsula.

But more than this—this insurrection will be one in which there will be no longer that control over popular feeling which would have resulted from the confidence in kings. Already it is said in excited masses of people, that there has been treason to the Italian cause. The charge is unfounded, but the effect upon popular passion is that with which we have now to deal. It is asked by earnest men if the promises held out to them by the French Emperor have been fulfilled?

It is said that the blood which was shed upon the plains of Lombardy has been shed in vain: that the nation has been deceived, and the cause of freedom



betrayed. In the present temper of the Italian mind, it will be difficult indeed for all the efforts of the true friends of Italy to repress these violent discontents, even in the interval that must occur before the final arrangement is made.

But if that arrangement be one which, while it emancipates Lombardy, still leaves the rest of Italy subject to Austrian influence, as it is now, what rational hope can any man have of the preservation of tranquillity for one week? The desperate efforts of those whom this arrangement would consign to perpetual slavery, would command the sympathy of freemen in every land.

Would it be possible to prevent the excitement extending itself to France? The bond of brotherhood that exists in the secret societies is not yet destroyed, and insurrection, under such circumstances, in Southern or Central Italy, would almost inevitably lead to disturbances in France.

But even were it possible that such a settlement were quietly accepted by the Italian nation, is it possible that it could last? The truth would still remain that free institutions in one country of the Peninsula are irreconcilable with the maintenance of

despotic power in the others. The difficulty of course increases with the increase of the power and territory of the free State. If the press is free at Milan, is it possible for Venice to rest contented in her chains? If Piedmont and Lombardy are free, and the rest of Italy continue as it is, the Italian battle must soon be fought over again, with just the advantage to the cause of freedom that it has acquired whatever strength belongs to the acquisition of Lombardy.

This, however, is not the settlement of the Italian question to which the great powers of Europe ever should assent.

With regard to Venice—once the question is brought fully and fairly before the opinion of Europe—there are many who will ask, as Lord Palmerston did in 1848—What right have we to hand over the Venetian people to the perpetual domination of Austria? This part of her dominions is exactly that to which her title has the least pretension of justice or right.

Are the people of Venice prepared quietly to submit? or must it not follow such an arrangement that after two or three years of discontent and oppression,

aggravated by the nearer vicinity of liberty in provinces that but lately shared their slavery, the Venetians will rise to vindicate their rights—and another Italian question still remain ?

Is Austria to maintain her despotic rule in the district she retains? It is impossible to continue such a system of government in Venice, with free institutions and a free press at Milan ?

It follows of necessity, from the establishment of free and national institutions in Lombardy, that Venice, even when united to Austria, must have a government that is both Italian and free. If this be not conceded, the perpetuation of Austrian tyranny in Venice is to make the Italian question an everlasting source of trouble and discontent.

It must be observed that the granting of free and national institutions to Venice need not prevent the retention by Austria, as a German power, of those fortresses which are so strangely considered essential to the safety of Germany. But no settlement of Italian affairs can offer even the prospect of peace which will not secure freedom to the states that have proved themselves worthy of it.

If France be true to the Italian cause, and if the

influence of England be honestly and sincerely exerted to attain this end, it must be accomplished. If, indeed, even now at the eleventh hour, England threw her weight into the scale of Italian independence, no other power can desert their cause.

The moment that any settlement is proposed which will secure independence and freedom to the people of Northern Italy, the wish of the English nation is, that all the moral influence of England should be exercised to secure its adoption. They have no sympathy either with Austrian domination, or with the Austrian lieutenants in Tuscany or Modena. If the people of Northern Italy choose freely and voluntarily to live under the government of Victor Emanuel, England's influence will not be exerted to prevent the realisation of their wishes. The union of all the northern districts of Italy into one great kingdom, with Victor Emanuel for its monarch, would best meet the wishes of the people, and at the same time, offers the best prospect of their happiness and freedom. In such an arrangement, if Venice must be governed by an Austrian Archduke, let her have still free institutions.

With England it may mainly rest, whether the

arrangement of Villa Franca is to end in giving peace and happiness to Italy, or in a mere temporary truce, which will leave all the elements of Italian disturbances in a little time to break out.

If Austria is not prepared to abandon that system of unjust influence by which she has maintained despotic government in so many parts of Italy, if she is still to be permitted to coerce Naples and dictate to the Pope, if her arms are found in any part of Italy, under any pretence of protection to sovereigns or of treaty right, the day is not far distant when war will be resumed—resumed under circumstances which will make it a war of opinion, extending to every country in which the passion for liberty is beating under the repression of tyrannic governments. If despotic power is really ready to enter on the contest with freedom for the sake of maintaining its dominion in Italy, the question will be nay it must be, raised over lands far wider than those to which the war has extended. No earthly power can restrain the hopes or the movements of excited nations. Facility of intercourse, rapidity of communication, the steam-boat, the rail, the steam-press, the electric telegraph, have established an

interchange of thought and feeling between nations, by which ideas literally flash in an electric shock through every portion of the civilized world. Wherever there is an oppressed nationality, thoughts will be stirred, and hopes excited, the movements of which no one can restrain; wherever there are men sullenly submitting to despotic institutions, there the opportunity of insurrection may not be lost.

Surely there are few European states in which such elements do not exist. It is not so long since 1848. The generation that then made revolutions in every capital has not yet all passed away. Let monarchs beware how they provoke the spirit that is not dead while that generation lives.

The friends of Italy hold in their hands the power which Canning once ascribed to England. They can unloose the elements of revolution. Rather despotism will do so, if it is mad enough to renew this war.

If the result of the coming negotiations be in any form or shape to reimpose the Austrian yoke,—if Italy could really be handed over to that blank oppression which her tyrants call peace—if this were done with the acquiescence or even neutrality of England, in what position would England be placed? In every

country in Europe her name would be execrated by the public. They would attribute their oppression to the treachery of "perfidious Albion," and England's moral influence over popular feeling in Europe would be lost.

Would we gain with the sovereigns what we lost with the people, and re-establish that regard for England of which the travellers who take their judgment of continental opinion from the saloons of despotic courts, accuse Lord Palmerston of depriving us. Impossible! They never will trust a power in which popular feeling may at any time compel our rulers to abandon the cause of despotic rule. In the despotic courts of Europe England is hated with a treble hatred. Because we are Protestant, because we are free—strange to say still more so, because of our monarchy and our aristocracy. The condition of England refutes the falsehood that these institutions cannot co-exist with the extension of popular right. It deprives tyranny of its argument. The very splendour of our nobles, above all the august majesty of a throne of which the occupant can trace her right to the unbroken succession of a thousand years, are a reproach to that feeling which

looks down on everything that is liberal, and would fain suppose, if it dare, that dignity and rank belong only to the associations of despotic courts.

In these courts England has not—England never can have sympathy ; and if ever the time comes when the policy which Metternich bequeathed to Austria could be carried out—if ever the time comes when free institutions can be suppressed over continental Europe, and the complete re-establishment of the reactionary system give courage and energy to despotic councils, a pretext will soon be found for combining the powers of the Continent against England.

It is not many years since Lord John Russell, speaking with the authority and the responsibility of Prime Minister, declared to the Parliament of his country that on the Continent there was a conspiracy against England. Is that conspiracy broken up? Where is its seat? Does not every Englishman know in his heart that it is at Vienna? Does any man who has read even the despatches quoted in these pages, believe that if Metternich had the power he would not have marched an army to London after the Reform Bill, to crush the changes that were “disturbing the



peace of Europe." Our insular situation and our strength protected us from such a friendly interference. Sardinia was not so protected, and this was the cause of the recent war.

But let no Englishman believe that the policy of Metternich has died with him. The reactionary conspiracy is still plotting—directed by wily heads, unscrupulous and stern hearts. If that conspiracy could succeed—if the sovereigns of Europe could all be bound in a holy league against the freedom of their people—if Henry V. could have re-occupied the throne of France—then, indeed, we would need all our defences to protect ourselves against an interference with our internal government as audacious as that which has been resisted in Piedmont.

The true interest and the best defence of England is to support the liberal cause upon the Continent. Every triumph of the reactionary party is a blow to our authority and our power. Every advance of freedom counts for us an influence, and gives us an ally. Were Sardinia crushed or forced to abandon her free institutions, it would have been a triumph and a strength to the conspirators against England. The establishment of a strong constitutional monarchy

in Northern Italy would be the best safeguard against their plans.

This, indeed, has been gained—solely gained by exertions from which we stood aloof, and by a magnanimous and far-sighted policy which puts the puny meddling of our Foreign Office to shame. But all is not yet accomplished, and fortunate, perhaps, it is for England's influence and England's honour, that it is yet open to her to aid in the glorious task of Italian regeneration. The French Emperor has plainly told us that to accomplish this requires the aid of free intelligence. In diplomacy, still more than in war, he will feel the inconvenience of being against the mind of Europe. Now that he has abundantly proved his moderation and disinterestedness, there is no excuse for withholding from the cause of Italian freedom the full sympathy and co-operation of England.

Cordially and fully to give that support is now alike the duty and the interest of England. No engagements fetter her, no contracts bind her; we are still uncommitted, free to take that course which we think fit. It is not possible for the English nation to hesitate in her choice—between Austria,

the centre of the conspiracy against the rights of man, and Piedmont, the rallying point of continental liberty. Our foreign seals are in the hands of a statesman deeply pledged to the cause of Italian freedom. God grant that he may not hesitate or falter in his course. Let him go boldly forward, affecting no false neutrality between despotism and freedom. The records of our Foreign Office should bear the impress of that spirit that is deeply stamped on everything that represents the nation. The people will support the Minister who will not shrink from speaking the national mind. In the establishment of a kingdom in Northern Italy strong enough to be independent, with institutions free enough to be liberal, and with a monarchy dignified enough to raise its head with pride among the crowns of Europe, incalculable benefits will be conferred upon the cause of human freedom and progress. A new power will be raised in the heart of Europe friendly to all that England values. The voice of emancipated Italy will be heard from her parliament and her press; everywhere her example will plead for free institutions; and that magnificent country, whose rights and happiness have been so ruthlessly sacrificed to

maintain the system of despotic power, may nobly requite the half century of her oppression and misery by teaching to the nations that trampled on her the value of free institutions, and insensibly diffusing among them the principles of order, of liberty, and of truth.

The enemies of freedom will never lightly or easily permit this. Its accomplishment will demand the exertion of all the influence of England in its support, but to have aided in the achievement of such a glorious result will place the name of the British statesman who will now take the part that becomes his country upon the roll of those who have done well for freedom and for mankind.



